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Alternative Labor Market Policies to Increase Economic 
Self-Sufficiency: Mandating Higher Wages, Subsidizing 
Employment, and Raising Productivity
*
 
The principal means by which individuals and families achieve economic self-sufficiency is 
through labor market earnings. As a consequence, it is natural for policy makers to look to 
interventions that increase the ability of individuals and families to achieve an adequate 
standard of living from participating in the labor market – a goal that has become even more 
prominent in the post-welfare reform era in the United States. This paper discusses some key 
policies that are used or can be used to increase economic self-sufficiency by increasing 
earnings, including mandating higher wages, subsidizing work, and increasing skill formation. 
Specifically, it reviews evidence on some of the main policies currently in place in the United 
States, including minimum and living wages, the Earned Income Tax Credit, wage subsidies, 
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* This chapter was prepared for the conference “Pathways to Self Sufficiency: Getting Ahead in an Era 
beyond Welfare Reform,” Madison, WI, September 6-7, 2007. I am grateful to Greg Duncan, Carolyn 
Heinrich, Harry Holzer, Karl Scholz, and other conference participants for helpful comments.  
NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
 
This paper reviews and synthesizes evidence on a subset of labor market policies that could 
potentially improve economic self-sufficiency via increasing earnings, including mandated wage 
floors, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and wage subsidies, and school-to-work programs.   
 
This review indicates that the minimum wage is an ineffective policy to promote economic self-
sufficiency through higher earnings. It reduces employment of the least-skilled individuals it is 
trying to help. That, in itself, does not imply that minimum wages do not on net help. The more 
telling evidence is that minimum wages do not deliver beneficial distributional effects to poor or 
near-poor families, and may make them worse off. In addition, they appear to have deleterious 
longer-run effects on earnings, presumably through reducing the accumulation of skills. 
Interestingly, though, living wages, which target different workers, present a more favorable 
tradeoff. They still entail disemployment effects, but appear to deliver more beneficial 
distributional effects. Of course the implication of the research on minimum wages is that 
sharply expanding the coverage of living wage laws would take us into the territory of minimum 
wages, with their concomitant adverse effects. Moreover, even if the findings on living wages 
might imply that at much higher levels minimum wages could have some beneficial distributional 
effects, the costs of raising the wage floor from current levels of minimum wages to the much 
higher levels typical of living wages could be very high.   
 
Labor supply incentives, in particular the EITC, appear effective. There seems fairly compelling 
evidence that a more generous EITC boosts employment of single mothers and in so doing 
raises incomes and earnings of low-income families. Wage subsidies are the flip side of trying to 
strengthen employment incentives, but provide the incentives to employers rather than 
employees. There is some evidence that these subsidies increase employment and earnings. 
However, problems of stigmatization resulting from eligibility for wage subsidy programs can 
offset some of the gains. On the other hand, coupling such programs with training and job 
search assistance may reduce problems associated with stigma and hence increase the 
benefits of wage subsidies. Another possible means to avoid stigmatization is to pay the subsidy 
to workers instead of to firms – a policy more like the EITC but based only on low wages.  
 
Wage subsidies paid to employees are worth considering. At present, though, there does not 
seem to be a great deal of political support for expanding wage subsidies. Moreover, a major 
effort in this direction entails substantial administrative difficulties. Thus, it may be that 
increasing the generosity of the EITC for unrelated individuals is a more realistic option for 
further extending subsidies to employment, especially if the goal is to increase earnings (and 
incomes) among those not currently eligible for the EITC. However, this may result in increased 
labor market competition and hence lower wages for the current beneficiaries of the EITC 
(families with children).  
 
Finally, a new but growing literature on school-to-work provides some support for the potential 
benefits of school-to-work institutions and programs. Although there is an absence of evidence 
on longer-run effects, it appears that institutions and programs to improve the school-to-work 






The principal means by which individuals and families achieve economic self-sufficiency is 
through labor market earnings. As a consequence, it is natural for policy makers to look to interventions 
that increase the ability of individuals and families to achieve an adequate standard of living from 
participating in the labor market. This chapter discusses some key policies that are used or can be used to 
increase economic self-sufficiency by increasing earnings.  
Policy makers have attempted to increase earnings by mandating higher wages, via minimum 
wages and, more recently, living wages. Of course mandating higher wage floors has the potential to 
discourage employment of low-skill workers, which is the source of much of the controversy over 
minimum wage floors.  
Perhaps the most prominent set of policy interventions and changes with respect to increasing 
earnings in pursuit of economic self-sufficiency have targeted the supply side, by trying to change the 
incentives to work. Welfare reform has clearly aimed to increase employment of the target population—
low-income households and low-skilled single mothers in particular—as have other policy changes 
including expansions of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), revised income tax schedules, and 
modifications to Medicaid and the provision of public health insurance to children. These policy 
interventions have sought to change labor supply on either the extensive or the intensive margin. There 
seems to be little doubt that these policy interventions have contributed to higher employment among the 
target population (for example, see Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2000; Blank and Schmidt, 2001; Blank, 
2002). Viewed from the perspective of increased employment and reduced caseloads, the combined 
effects of welfare reform and these other changes appears to have been a successful effort to increase 
earnings, although that, of course, does not mean families are better off.
1   
An alternative policy that operates instead on the demand side is a wage subsidy program targeted 
toward low-skilled or disadvantaged individuals. A wage subsidy program can take many forms, 
depending in part on who is targeted, but all share the basic structure of subsidizing wages to increase 
                                                 




demand for workers (shifting out the labor demand curve), thereby raising their employment and earnings 
(see Katz, 1998). The current incarnation of wage subsidies in the United States is the Work Opportunity 
Tax Credit (WOTC), which targets young workers in disadvantaged families or who are “high-risk,” and 
members of families receiving TANF, as well as a few other groups.
2 
Of course, a key alternative to increasing incentives for work and increasing wages or demand for 
low-skilled or disadvantaged workers is to try to directly raise the productivity of such workers through 
training and education. Viewed through this lens, one could view much of the entire body of research on 
the human capital model as pointing to ways to increase earnings. For example, there is little 
disagreement that schooling increases earnings, even if there is continuing debate about the magnitude of 
the effect. And a simple policy goal of trying to increase schooling is even more compelling in light of 
increased returns to schooling in recent decades.
3 In addition, one could view research by labor 
economists linking educational reform to earnings (e.g., Betts, 1995; Card and Krueger, 1992; Hanushek, 
2006) as also pointing to policy interventions to increase economic self-sufficiency via earnings.  
I focus more narrowly on one dimension of schooling- and training-related policies with which 
policy experience is quite recent, and for which research findings have only recently begun to emerge—in 
particular, the set of institutions that surround the school-to-work transition. This focus is not intended to 
suggest anything about the weighting of the importance of alternative human capital-related policies for 
increasing earnings, but rather to add information on what we have learned from the recent experience 
with and research about school-to-work to the broader research literature on human capital and 
educational reform.   
More generally, I have chosen to emphasize policies for which I can bring my own expertise to 
bear and also provide the most valuable contribution to the policy debate by highlighting recent research. 
Thus, in addition to school-to-work, the chapter focuses on mandated wage floors (minimum and living 
                                                 
2 See http://www.uses.doleta.gov/wotcdata.cfm (viewed May 2, 2007). 
3 For evidence on efforts to increase schooling levels at the post-secondary level, see, e.g., Cornwell et al. (2006). 
One policy effort to increase primary or secondary schooling of disadvantaged youths is the “learnfare” program, 
implemented in a handful of states. Under learnfare, welfare benefits can be cut if children of recipient families 




wages) and employment incentives (the EITC and wage subsidies). Obviously, the potential scope of this 
chapter—what government policy can do to increase workers’ and families’ earnings—is far more 
extensive.
4 Innumerable papers and many books have been written, for example, about welfare reform, 
job training, the EITC, the minimum wage, and educational reform. I can neither touch on all of the 
potential policy levers, nor even adequately treat those mentioned in the preceding discussion. In 
particular, I do not discuss welfare reform or job training programs—topics on which there is a great deal 
of high-quality research.
5 I also do not address policies to increase schooling nor efforts at educational 
reform aside from school-to-work. 
II. Mandating Higher Wages 
The minimum wage has been a central component of the nation’s efforts to help families achieve 
economic self-sufficiency since early in the last century. The federal minimum was instituted in 1938, and 
was predated by earlier efforts in some states. Increases in the federal minimum wage were sporadic but 
over the longer term largely preserved the real value of the minimum wage until the early 1980s. Since 
then, there have been two rounds of increases (and another was recently approved). However, the states 
have run well ahead of the federal government on this issue, and as of January 2007, 29 states plus the 
District of Columbia had minimum wages above the federal level (Table 1). A related development has 
been the advent of living wages since the mid-1990s, which have now spread to over 140 cities and other 
localities.   
Do minimum wages and living wages hold out the promise of enabling individuals to earn more 
                                                 
4 Aside from what the government can do, there is a large and growing literature on the effects of what are often 
called “high-road” work practices on firms and workers that lead to more productive and higher-wage jobs (see, 
e.g., Cappelli and Neumark, 2001; Handel and Levine, 2004). However, although policies to encourage firms to 
adopt such practices are often advocated (e.g., Osterman et al., 2002), it is unclear exactly what policies would 
achieve this. One argument that is sometimes made is that a higher minimum wage would encourage employers to 
adopt such practices, by raising the productivity level at which it is profitable to hire a worker (Bernstein, 2000; 
Fitzgerald, 2006), in which case high-road practices might lead to skill upgrading. Of course a higher minimum 
wage increases the productivity of labor in the neoclassical model with no necessary implications for what 
practices firms adopt, as firms move up the labor demand curve; and there is no direct evidence that minimum 
wages change firms’ practices. Another tactic that has emerged is corporate responsibility campaigns by 
community groups or labor unions to encourage the creation of high-wage jobs; see, e.g., 
http://www.workingforamerica.org/documents/Journal4/regional.htm (viewed May 2, 2007). 
5 Regarding welfare reform, see the references cited above, and regarding training, see, e.g., Heckman et al. (1999). 
For a very recent discussion of adult training and other workforce development policies, see the volume edited by 




and families to exit and remain out of poverty? The research literature on the minimum wage is 
enormous. William Wascher and I recently completed an extensive review of the evidence on the 
employment effects of minimum wages (Neumark and Wascher, 2007a), and we are completing a book 
that discusses the effects of minimum wages on many outcomes related to economic well-being 
(Neumark and Wascher, forthcoming). Here, I discuss the main conclusions and report some key 
evidence pertaining to the relationship between minimum wages, earnings, and income.  
II.1. Minimum Wages and Employment 
 
The controversy over the question of the effects of minimum wages on employment is extensive 
and well-known. Neumark and Wascher (2007a) provide an extensive review of the evidence on this 
question, beginning with a series of papers published in 1992 in an Industrial and Labor Relations Review 
symposium, and encompassing over 100 papers covering the United States and other countries written 
over the past fifteen years. Much of the political debate surrounding proposed changes in the minimum 
wage concerns the potential effects on employment. Although we do not view that focus as entirely 
appropriate, the potential disemployment effects are of course the channel that could dissipate or even 
outweigh the gains to low-skilled individuals from higher wages.  
What do we learn from our review? First, there certainly is a much wider range of estimates of 
the effects of the minimum wage on employment than was the case in the earlier time-series literature 
reviewed by Brown et al. (1982). For example, few of the studies in the Brown et al. survey were outside 
of the consensus range of −.1 to −.3 for the elasticity of teenage employment with respect to the minimum 
wage. In contrast, even limiting the focus to studies of the effects of the minimum wage on teenagers in 
the United States, the range of estimates in the more recent research extends from well below −1 to well 
above zero. This wider range of estimates reflects the fact that the newer literature uses a variety of 
methods and approaches to identify the effects of minimum wages—including estimates for narrow 
subsets of workers and specific industries—whereas the earlier literature was for the most part based on 
aggregate time-series data that changed only by the addition of more data with the passage of time 




  Second, although the wide range of estimates is striking, the oft-stated assertion that the new 
minimum wage research fails to support the traditional view that the minimum wage reduces the 
employment of low-skilled workers is clearly incorrect. Indeed, in our view, the preponderance of the 
evidence points to disemployment effects. In particular, we focus on 102 studies, excluding from 
consideration a few that fail to pass very minimum quality standards, and others that use largely the same 
data and approach as papers included in this set without really supplying independent information.
6 Of 
these 102 studies, by our reckoning nearly two-thirds give a relatively consistent (although by no means 
always statistically significant) indication of negative employment effects of minimum wages, while only 
eight give a relatively consistent indication of positive employment effects. In addition, we identify 33 
studies (or on occasion analyses in papers that present multiple analyses) that we view as providing the 
most credible evidence. Among these, 28 (85 percent) point to negative employment effects. Moreover, in 
research that focuses on the least-skilled groups most likely to be adversely affected by minimum wages, 
the evidence for disemployment effects seems especially strong, with minimum wages harming the least-
skilled workers more than is suggested by the net disemployment effects estimated in many studies.
7 In 
contrast, we see very few—if any—cases where a study provides convincing evidence of positive 
employment effects of minimum wages. 
Some lessons about the research literature can also be drawn. First, our survey indicates that 
longer panel studies that incorporate both state and time variation in minimum wages, and study broad 
sets of low-skilled individuals, tend, on the whole, to find negative and statistically significant 
employment effects from minimum wage increases, often with estimated elasticities near the range of 
those from the earlier Brown et al. survey, although sometimes larger.
8 On the other hand, the majority of 
the U.S. studies that find zero or positive effects of the minimum wage on low-skill employment were 
either short panel data studies or case studies of the effects of a state-specific change in the minimum 
                                                 
6 For the most part, this leads to the exclusion of some of the studies Wascher and I co-authored, which tend to find 
disemployment effects of minimum wages.  
7 See Abowd et al. (2000), Currie and Fallick (1996), and Neumark et al. (2004).  




wage on a particular industry (or both).
9 The short panel analyses may encompass too short of a time 
period to capture the full effects of minimum wage changes given the time that is often needed to adjust 
the production process to economize on low-skilled labor, and indeed the inclusion of lagged effects 
seems to help in reconciling alternative estimates of minimum wage effects.  
There is also a serious substantive concern about case studies of narrow industries. In particular, 
the standard competitive model provides little guidance as to the expected sign of the employment effects 
of the minimum wage in the narrow industries usually considered in these studies. When there are 
multiple industries or sectors affected by a higher minimum wage, then if a minimum wage increase 
pushes up costs for one product more than for another substitutable product, the demand for the latter 
product can increase even though the minimum wage has increased its price. That is, when there are 
multiple products that are viewed as close substitutes by consumers, the scale effect can operate in the 
opposite direction for products that are produced with a smaller share (in costs) of minimum wage labor. 
As a result, the neoclassical model does not make firm predictions about the effects of minimum wage 
increases on an industry-by-industry basis, and thus either a failure by researchers to find a decline in 
less-skilled employment in a narrow industry, or evidence of an increase in employment, should not 
necessarily be viewed as inconsistent with the predictions of the competitive model or as informative 
about the overall effects of the policy.  
II.2. The Distributional Effects of Minimum Wages 
Despite minimum wages reducing employment among the less skilled, minimum wages could 
have offsetting beneficial effects because of income gains resulting from higher mandated wages. And it 
is possible that these income gains tend to accrue to the lowest-income families. Indeed, this is the 
argument sometimes made by those who advocate minimum wage increases.
10 In my view, although the 
distributional question is central, it often receives short shrift in research and debates about the minimum 
                                                 
9 Key examples include Card and Krueger (1994 and 2000); but see also Neumark and Wascher (2000) and Card 
(1992).  
10 For example, in response to a presentation of the findings from the minimum wage review just discussed, Jared 
Bernstein of the Economic Policy Institute, which advocates a much higher minimum wage, responded “The 
minimum wage increase will invariably hurt some of its intended beneficiaries … [But] the benefits will often 
outweigh the costs, even for narrowly-affected workers.” See 




wage, with critics of minimum wages blithely ignoring the possibility that even if minimum wages do 
reduce employment they may have beneficial distributional effects, while advocates simply assume that 
the distributional effects must be beneficial. In fact, as this section explains, research fails to establish that 
minimum wages have beneficial distributional effects that outweigh the employment losses.  
II.2.A. Effects on Low-Wage Workers
11 
It is commonly claimed that existing estimates of minimum wage employment elasticities imply 
that minimum wages must on average raise incomes of low-wage workers. The argument is that if the 
employment elasticity for these workers is in the −.1 to −.2 range suggested by many studies of teenagers 
and young adults, then because the elasticity is below 1 in absolute value a higher minimum wage must 
raise incomes of affected workers (Freeman, 1996).
12 However, this argument is flawed. Teenagers or 
young adults are typically studied in research on the employment effects of minimum wages because a 
large share of them work at or near the minimum wage, so that the effects of minimum wages are more 
likely to be evident for these groups than for others. Nonetheless, many teenagers and young adults earn 
significantly more than the minimum wage. As a result, the reported elasticities from studies of teenagers 
will tend to understate the elasticity of demand with respect to the minimum wage for the least-skilled 
workers among them who are directly affected by the minimum wage. The same argument applies with 
greater force to the broader adult population, because the share of adult workers at the minimum is much 
smaller. The estimated elasticity from the usual minimum wage study also underestimates the relevant 
elasticity of demand for affected workers because, with some affected workers already earning more than 
the old minimum wage (but less than the new minimum wage) when the minimum wage increases, the 
size of the average wage increase associated with a minimum wage increase will be less than the 
minimum wage increase itself.
13  
To examine more directly how minimum wages affect low-wage workers, Neumark et al. (2004) 
                                                 
11 Much of the discussion in this subsection and the next comes from Neumark and Wascher (forthcoming), and 
would also apply to hours effects.  
12 The elasticity referred to here is the estimated percentage change in employment caused by a minimum wage 
increase, divided by the percentage change in the minimum wage. Thus, for example, an elasticity of −.1 
estimated for teenagers implies that teenage employment would decline by 1 percent in response to 10-percent 
increase in the minimum wage.   




estimate various margins of minimum wage effects, including wages, employment, hours (conditional on 
remaining employed), and—most importantly for the purposes of this discussion—labor income, using 
individual-level matched observations on those aged 16 and older from the CPS ORG files for the years 
1979-1997. For each outcome, we estimate a model that interacts the change in the effective minimum 
wage for each state-month observation with a set of indicator variables that describe where each 
individual’s initial wage stands in relation to the minimum wage.
14 The model also includes these 
indicator variables separately, as well as individual controls and a full set of state-year interactions. 
Minimum wage effects are therefore identified from differential changes in outcomes for workers at 
similar points in the wage distribution who experience different minimum wage changes, and the 
approach generates estimates of the effects of minimum wage increases on these outcomes at various 
points of the wage distribution. We estimate both contemporaneous effects and cumulative effects that 
allow one-year lags.  
The estimates are summarized in graphical form in Figure 1. The figure displays the differential 
between the changes experienced by workers in states with a 10-percent minimum wage increase, versus 
workers in states without an increase, at comparable points of the wage distribution. The lightly-shaded 
bars are the contemporaneous effects, and the dark bars also incorporate the lagged effects of minimum 
wages. For contemporaneous effects on wages, the elasticity of wages with respect to the minimum is 
about .8 for workers at the minimum or below 1.1 times the minimum.
15 The elasticity falls to about .4 for 
workers between 1.1 and 1.3 times the minimum, to about .25 for workers between 1.3 and 1.5 times the 
minimum, and to .15 for workers between 1.5 and 2 times the minimum, petering out higher in the wage 
distribution. The cumulative contemporaneous plus lagged effects tell a somewhat different story, with 
the elasticity near the minimum wage falling to about .4, and declining for the cells slightly higher in the 
                                                 
14 The sample conditions on the initial wage, and hence the models are estimated for those initially working. 
15 Note that the estimated contemporaneous elasticity below the minimum is quite a bit higher. Estimates for the part 
of the wage distribution below the minimum are likely less reliable for a couple of reasons, including regression to 
the mean in wage data erroneously reported as below the minimum, and transitions between uncovered or tipped 
jobs and covered jobs. The latter scenario is likely to have a positive influence on the estimate for this cell, 
because the jump in the wage upon moving to a covered job will be higher the more the minimum has increased. 
Finally, minimum wage increases may be followed by upward (perhaps temporary) ratcheting of minimum wage 




wage distribution. The difference in the estimates once lags are included suggests that a substantial part of 
the wage gains caused by minimum wage increases are “given back” in the following year, likely because 
employers forego the usual nominal wage increases in subsequent years for workers whose wages were 
increased by the minimum wage, while workers at the same position in the wage distribution in states 
without minimum wage increases receive these increases. 
For workers initially earning close to the minimum wage, the estimated employment elasticities 
range from about −.06 to −.15 and are often statistically significant. The estimated elasticities are close to 
the so-called consensus range of estimated disemployment effects for teenagers (e.g., Brown et al., 1982), 
even though here we are considering all workers. However, as suggested by the combined 
contemporaneous and lagged estimates, these disemployment effects are partially offset in the second 
year, with the total effect becoming smaller and statistically weaker, although remaining strongly 
significant for workers with initial wages between 1.2 and 1.3 times the minimum.  
There are moderate contemporaneous hours reductions for workers paid at or below the 
minimum, but no significant effect on those paid slightly above the minimum wage. For the cumulative 
effects, for individuals below the minimum the estimated total effect on hours is more negative than the 
contemporaneous effect alone. More important, the figure reveals hours reductions for workers initially 
paid at or just above the minimum wage, with elasticities near −.3; the estimates for both cells are 
strongly significant. The pattern of stronger employment effects initially, but stronger hours effects later, 
is consistent with employers first laying off part-time workers to reduce fixed costs of labor, and then 
later adjusting downward hours of the remaining low-wage workers.  
Finally, we turn to earned income. The contemporaneous effects are positive (and significant for 
most cells) for workers initially earning up to twice the minimum wage, in both figures. However, the 
total effects tell a much different story. As shown by the dark bars, workers initially below the minimum, 
at the minimum, and up to 1.1 times the minimum, experience income declines. The estimated effect for 
minimum wage workers is on the order of a 6-percent decline and is statistically significant at the 5-




of the figures. Although disemployment effects are tempered, hours reductions after one year are much 
sharper, and the wage gains considerably weaker.  
Overall, then, this analysis indicates that very low-wage workers are, on average, not helped by 
minimum wage increases, and instead are hurt, despite the wage increases among those who stay 
employed. Although minimum wages bump up wages of these workers, hours reductions, in particular, 
interact with changes in wages in such a way that earned income declines.
16 
II.2.B. Effects on Low-Income Families 
What about the effects on family incomes? Because poverty is defined based on family income, 
minimum wage workers need not be in poor families. Gramlich (1976), using data from the early 1970s, 
showed that there were many low-wage workers in non-poor and even above-median income families. 
More recent evidence (Burkhauser and Sabia, 2007) echoes Gramlich’s earlier conclusions. For example, 
in March 2003 CPS data, 4.2 percent of all workers were in poor families, while only 13.2 percent of 
workers earning a wage less than $7.25 were in poor families.
17 Alternatively, using a definition of low-
wage workers based on half the average private sector wage, in the 2003 data 46.3—or nearly one-half—
of low-wage workers were in families with incomes 3 times the poverty line or higher, while 24.2 percent 
were in poor or near-poor families.  
These numbers clearly imply that many of the potential benefits of a higher minimum wage could 
flow to higher-income families. The key question, however, is how the distribution of family incomes is 
actually affected by minimum wage increases. Minimum wages undoubtedly create winners and losers, 
and neither the types of descriptive statistics just discussed, nor the fairly large number of studies that try 
to simulate the effects of minimum wages on the distribution of family incomes (e.g., Horrigan and 
Mincy, 1993; Card and Krueger, 1995; Burkhauser et al., 1996), describe the actual distributional effects 
of minimum wages and their incidence across the distribution of family incomes. 
In order to provide a rich description of how minimum wages affect the distribution of family 
                                                 
16 Unlike many employment analyses in the minimum wage literature, this evidence pertains to all low-wage 
workers, not just, for example, teenagers. And Neumark et al. (2004) show that the results are very similar if teens 
are excluded.   




income relative to needs, Neumark et al. (2005) develop a difference-in-differences non-parametric 
approach, using matched March CPS files from 1986-1995. This approach yields estimates of the effects 
of minimum wages on the proportion of families that are poor or near-poor, and of the extent to which 
minimum wages push families initially near-poor into poverty, or lift initially poor families out of 
poverty. However, the non-parametric approach also allows a richer empirical description of the effects of 
minimum wages on family incomes.
18    
The main results are displayed in Figure 2, which presents the entire set of density estimations 
that are used to infer the effects of minimum wage increases on the distribution of income-to-needs. Panel 
A presents evidence on changes in the income-to-needs distribution in states with contemporaneous 
minimum wage increases compared to states with no contemporaneous minimum wage increases. The 
left-hand graph presents estimates of the densities in year 1 and year 2 for the treatment group 
(observations with increases), while the middle graph presents the corresponding densities for the control 
group. The vertical axis shows the proportion of families at each income-to-needs level. Because the 
differences between the densities in each panel are hard to distinguish visually, the right-hand graph 
summarizes the information by plotting the vertical distance between the year 1 and year 2 densities, for 
both the treatment and control groups, using a different scale. 
The difference-in-differences estimates of the effects of contemporaneous minimum wage 
increases on income-to-needs are the vertical distances between these two lines. The vertical distance is 
displayed in the left-hand graph of Panel C, with slight adjustment based on the need to account for the 
fact that, for example, some states with no contemporaneous increase had an increase in the previous 
year. The results indicate that the effect of contemporaneous minimum wage increases is to reduce the 
proportion of families with income-to-needs between 0 and about .6, to increase the proportion with 
                                                 
18 This approach does not provide explicit estimates of the influences of various regression controls such changes in 
welfare benefits and in the wage distribution. But it potentially accounts for a wide range of factors that might 
alter the distribution of income. For example, business cycles and the corresponding changes in unemployment 
rates, rising earnings inequality stemming from other sources, and demographic trends (all national phenomena) 
are controlled for if these effects are equally evident in the treatment and control groups. However, in a simpler 
parametric regression analysis, Neumark and Wascher (2002) find that the inclusion of controls for these 





income-to-needs between .6 and 1.5, and to reduce the proportion with income-to-needs from 1.5 to about 
2.7. These results are consistent with minimum wages helping the poorest families, but they also suggest 
that some families with initial income-to-needs in the range from 1.5 to about 2.7 experience income 
losses. 
The graphs in Panel B of the figure report results when the treatment group is defined as those 
observations for which there was a lagged minimum wage increase, and the difference-in-differences 
estimates of the lagged minimum wage effect are reported in the middle graph of Panel C. In contrast to 
the estimated effects of contemporaneous minimum wage increases, lagged increases unambiguously 
raise the proportion of families below about 1.3 times the poverty line, with corresponding decreases in 
the proportion of families with income-to-needs between 1.3 and 3.2. This evidence, and the contrast with 
contemporaneous effects, is consistent with disemployment effects (or hours reductions) occurring with a 
lag, while the contemporaneous effect reflects more of the impact of immediate wage increases—which 
the results discussed earlier (displayed in Figure 1) suggest diminish over time.  
The total effect of minimum wage increases, shown in the right-hand graph of Panel C, is the sum 
of the contemporaneous and lagged effects. The estimated effect at each particular point of the income-to-
needs distribution is given by the middle curve, while the upper and lower curves are the tails of the 95-
percent confidence interval, calculated using a bootstrap procedure. The results are quite striking. There is 
essentially no change in the proportion of families with income-to-needs below .3, as the benefit 
associated with the contemporaneous increase is offset by the cost of the lagged increase. There is a 
marked increase in the proportion of families with income-to-needs between about .3 and 1.4, and a 
marked decrease in the proportion of families with income-to-needs between about 1.4 and 3.3. These 
results suggest that the overall net effect of minimum wage increases is to push some families that are 
initially low-income but above the near-poverty line into poverty or near-poverty. On a point-by-point 
basis, the estimated increases in the proportions of families with income-to-needs from about .6 to 1.2 are 
statistically significant.  




that the minimum wage has essentially no effect on the proportion of families with income-to-needs 
between 0 and .5, but leads to significant increases in the proportion of families between .5 and 1 and the 
proportion below 1. There is also a significant (at the 10-percent level) increase in the proportion of near-
poor families, and a statistically significant increase in the proportion of poor or near-poor families. The 
estimated elasticity of changes in the proportion poor or near-poor with respect to the minimum wage is 
approximately .41, and the average minimum wage increase in the sample increases the proportion of 
families in these categories (combined) by .013, and the proportion poor by .008. 
Table 3 illustrates more clearly how families with incomes initially above the poverty or near-
poverty line might be affected by an increase in the minimum wage. Although minimum wage workers 
(those earning less than 1.1 times the minimum) account for a very small share of primary earners in 
families above 1.5 times the poverty line (the second panel), it is not unusual for the lowest-paid worker 
in higher-income families to be paid at or below the minimum wage (the third panel). And as shown in 
the fourth panel, which presents the distribution of workers in each wage category across income-to-needs 
categories, there is nearly as large a proportion of minimum wage workers (including those below the 
minimum) in families with incomes between 1.5 and 3 times the poverty line as in families between 0 and 
1.5 times the poverty line, and actually a greater proportion of minimum wage workers in families with 
incomes-to-needs between 1.5 and 3 than below the poverty line. Thus, the evidence that minimum wage 
increases cause somewhat higher-income families to fall below the near-poverty line could easily reflect 
job losses among low-wage workers in these families, and calculations reported in Neumark et al. (2005) 
indicate that the numbers of such secondary workers suggest that the magnitudes of the estimated effects 
just discussed are quite plausible. At the same time, it is worth emphasizing that the research literature 
does not yet include evidence that directly estimates the effects of minimum wages on workers classified 
by both wage levels and family incomes. That is, the evidence just discussed suggests that the adverse 
effects of minimum wages tend to fall on low-wage workers in low-income families, but that is an 
inference from the effects of minimum wages on the distribution of family incomes, rather than a 




These conclusions are consistent with the broader literature on the distributional effects of 
minimum wages, which is summarized in Table 4.
19 All of these studies rely on CPS data, but they differ 
in terms of sample period studied, subgroups considered, the measurement of income (before- versus 
after-tax), and the measures of the income distribution (poverty rate, squared poverty gap,
20 and income 
inequality measures). Overall, the evidence can be viewed as leading to one of two conclusions, 
depending on exactly what specifications and approaches one prefers. Either there is no evidence that the 
minimum wage has beneficial distributional effects, or the minimum wage harms those at the bottom of 
the income distribution. In no case, though, is there evidence that minimum wages help poor or low-
income families.
21  
II.3. Living Wages 
In the mid-1990s, political support for minimum wage floors was manifested in a new arena—
local governments. In cities and other local jurisdictions across the country, campaigns arose in support of 
“living wages,” and governments adopted them by the score. Details on eight of the largest cities where 
living wages have been implemented are provided in Table 5. Clearly many of these are quite higher than 
minimum wages in the respective states (column (2)), and there are considerably higher (and lower) living 
wages in other cities. On the other hand, living wage laws have much narrower coverage. As shown in 
column (3)—and as is true more generally of living wage laws—nearly all living wage laws cover city 
contractors, while about half also cover companies that receive financial assistance from cities (such as 
                                                 
19 A more detailed discussion is provided in Neumark and Wascher (forthcoming). I omit from Table 4 the study by 
Addison and Blackburn (1999), which focuses only on narrow subsets of families and therefore does not speak to 
the overall effects of minimum wages on poverty or the income distribution. 
20 The squared poverty gap contains more information, capturing how far families are below the poverty line. It 
satisfies two properties that might well be desirable in a distributional analysis: first, a reduction in the income of 
a poor family increases the poverty measure; and second, a transfer of income from a poor family to any less-poor 
family increases the poverty measure. The simple poverty measure (which is a headcount) satisfies neither of 
these.  
21 There are some related questions about the effects of minimum wages on the family income distribution for 
different types of families. For example, minimum wages may have different effects on rural and urban families. 
Wu et al. (2006b) report evidence suggesting that minimum wages increase pre-tax and post-tax family income 
inequality in urban areas, and more so when more weight is put on the lower end of the distribution. These results 
for urban areas are consistent with their aggregated results presented in Table 4. However, they find very small 
and insignificant distributional effects of minimum wages in rural areas. Gunderson and Ziliak (2004) contrast 
some of their results for female-headed versus married-couple families. Across their different specifications, there 
is no clear pattern of differences across family structure in how the minimum wage affects the poverty rate or the 




subsidies and tax abatements). In contrast, living wages rarely apply to city employees. Coverage 
estimates are very hard to come by, especially for living wage laws that cover financial assistance 
recipients, for which city-level information is typically decentralized. Estimates of coverage by city 
contractor provisions are typically below 1 to 2 percent, although there is considerable variation in these 
estimates, and in some cities coverage is higher because of how the law is specified;
22 coverage by 
financial assistance provisions of living wage laws is even less clear.
23  
There is ample evidence that living wages raise wages, and also that they cause some 
employment losses, although not surprisingly there is some controversy about the latter conclusions; see 
Adams and Neumark (2004 and 2005b). Estimates of wage and employment effects from CPS data are 
reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 6.  
What about distributional effects? Results from CPS analyses are reported in column (3) of Table 
6. The evidence yields negative point estimates (implying poverty reductions) for both contractor-only 
and the broader financial assistance living wage laws, but only the estimated effect of financial assistance 
living wage laws is statistically significant (at the 10-percent level). For the latter, the estimated 
coefficient of −.024 implies that a one log unit (100 percent) increase in the living wage reduces the 
poverty rate by 2.4 percent.
24 Relative to an 18.6 percent poverty rate, this represents a 12 percent 
reduction, or an elasticity of −.12. This seems like a large effect, given a wage elasticity for low-wage 
workers below .1. However, the anti-poverty effects of living wages likely do not come from lifting 
families from well below the poverty line to well above it, but instead from nudging families over the 
                                                 
22 See the summary of coverage estimates in Adams and Neumark (2005a) and in Freeman (2005). For more 
systematic estimates of coverage by the living wage laws in Los Angeles and San Francisco, see Fairris et al. 
(2005) and Alunan et al. (1999). 
23 The most recent development with regard to living wages has been the advent of city-level minimum wages—i.e., 
broad minimum wage floors just like state minimum wages, but enacted at the city level. Santa Fe and San 
Francisco enacted a minimum of $8.50 in 2003 and 2004, respectively, with both set to rise through indexation 
and (in Santa Fe) planned increases in the legislation. Madison and other smaller towns in Wisconsin also recently 
passed minimum wage laws, but they were subsequently repealed by state laws. A city minimum wage in New 
Orleans was approved by voters in 2002, but subsequently blocked by a state law. (Washington, DC has its own 
minimum wage, but is often treated as a state in state-level analyses of minimum wage effects like those described 
earlier.)    
24 It might be viewed as curious that the estimate for contractor-only living wage laws, although insignificant, is 
larger, in light of the smaller wage and employment effects for contractor-only laws. But the offsetting positive 
wage effects and negative employment effects of financial assistance living wage laws (see columns (1) and (2) of 
Table 6) imply that these laws need not have a stronger effect on poverty. Yet the estimate for contractor-only 




poverty line; and these average wage effects are likely manifested as much larger gains concentrated on a 
possibly quite small number of workers and families.
25  
Note that these positive distributional effects are different from the adverse (or perhaps simply 
non-existent) distributional effects of minimum wages. There is no necessary contradiction in these 
findings, however. Although economic theory predicts that raising mandated wage floors will lead to 
employment reductions—and the evidence from both minimum wages and living wages is consistent with 
this prediction—theory makes no predictions regarding the effects of mandated wage floors on the 
distribution of family incomes, or on poverty specifically. The distributional effects depend on both the 
magnitudes of the wage and employment effects (and other effects), and on their incidence throughout the 
family income distribution. The gains and losses from living wages may be of quite different magnitudes, 
and fall at different points in the distribution of family income, than do the gains and losses from 
minimum wages—depending in part on the types of workers who are affected by these alternative types 
of mandated wage floors.  
Indeed there is evidence of significant differences in the populations of affected workers. Fairris 
et al. (2005) report descriptive statistics for workers directly affected by the living wage, based on their 
survey in Los Angeles. In this sample, 4 percent are teenagers (their Table 3.1). I extracted CPS data for 
Los Angeles for the same years (2002-2003). Overall, among workers the percentage of teenagers is 4.2, 
very similar to their living wage sample. However, when I restrict the sample to minimum wage workers, 
the share of teenagers is much higher. For example, among those earning between $5.15 and $7.25 (the 
state minimum wage $6.75, and the federal minimum $5.15), 14.9 percent are teenagers; focusing only on 
                                                 
25 The size of some of these estimated effects may seem surprisingly large, given relatively low coverage by living 
wage laws. With respect to poverty reductions, Adams and Neumark (2004) explain that their estimates are of the 
same order of magnitude suggested by Brenner’s (2005) calculations based on data for Boston. With respect to 
wage and employment effects, the estimates are large given coverage estimates. One possibility is that there are 
non-neoclassical influences, so that living wage laws affect community norms for wages; one channel for this may 
be that firms desirous of future contracts or development subsidies believe it is advantageous to pay higher wages 
(Bartik, 2004). At the same time, some critics have grossly overstated the implications of these estimates for 
employment declines. Fairris and Reich (2005, p. 10) incorrectly calculate that the Adams and Neumark estimates 
imply huge employment losses. In fact, the 35 percent living wage increase that they consider, for a financial 
assistance living wage law, is estimated to lead to a 6 percent employment decline among those in the bottom 
tenth of the skill distribution (.35 multiplied by the employment effect of −.076 reported in column (2) of Table 6, 
divided by the .44 employment rate in the bottom tenth of the skill distribution). This contrasts with the 91 percent 




those earning exactly $6.75, the percentage is 14.1. Thus, these data suggest that workers affected by the 
living wage, although surely less skilled than the average, are quite similar to the overall workforce in 
terms of age distribution, with about 4 percent teenagers. In contrast, for workers likely affected by a 
minimum wage, the share of teenagers is more than three times as high. This presumably helps to explain 
why living wages have more beneficial distributional effects than do minimum wages, because in the 
former case there is less scope for the gains to be concentrated among teenagers (as well as young adults 
aged 20-24, who also represent a high percentage of minimum wage workers, and together with teens 
about one-third of minimum wage workers in Los Angeles). It would clearly be useful, however, to better 
understand how the different distributional effects arise. 
II.4. Minimum Wages and Skills 
The evidence on minimum wage (and living wage) effects discussed to this point focuses on 
short-run effects, typically looking at effects at most a year after minimum wage increases. There are, 
however, potential effects of minimum wages in the longer-run. Why might these longer-run effects 
arise? First, minimum wages may lower training among young workers—training that would increase 
wages.
26 In particular, when we consider training to improve skills on the current job, as in the standard 
human capital model, workers undergoing such training have lower productivity when the training is 
occurring. Such training is typically financed by lower wages, but if productivity during training falls 
below the minimum wage floor, training may be deterred (Hashimoto, 1982; Feldstein, 1973). On the 
other hand, in theory minimum wages can also increase training. Workers may undergo training to qualify 
for a job (just as they may stay in school to qualify for a higher wage job), in which case a higher 
minimum wage can spur more investment in skill.  
There is evidence from CPS data that minimum wages reduce formal training for 20-24 year-olds 
                                                 
26 The research literature on the effects of training is large. While the theory of how training effects wages has been 
around for a long time (Becker, 1962), much evidence has been indirect, because of the absence of data with 
measures of on-the-job training, much of which is informal. Furthermore, estimating causal effects of training is 
complicated by the fact that more talented workers may obtain jobs with greater opportunities for training. Bishop 
(1996) provides a thorough review of evidence using more recent data sets with improved measures of on-the-job 
training, and utilizing longitudinal data to estimate the effect of training on wage growth rather than wage levels, 
as a way of reducing the bias from the correlation between training and unobservables that shift wage levels. He 




(Neumark and Wascher, 2001a). Mixed evidence is report by Fairris and Pedace (2004), while Acemoglu 
and Pischke (2003) find no evidence of effects on training one way or the other. Overall, I regard the 
evidence on the effects of minimum wages on training as pointing to possible adverse effects, but hardly 
conclusive.  
Minimum wages may also affect schooling. The impact could be positive or negative (see 
Cunningham, 1981; and Ehrenberg and Marcus, 1980). In the simplest setting, a higher minimum wage 
has an ambiguous effect on expected earnings from labor force participation, as wages go up but the 
probability of employment declines. If expected earnings decline because the impact of fewer jobs at the 
minimum wage outweighs the impact of a higher wage, we would expect more individuals to remain in 
school, for two reasons. First, individuals may choose to remain in school to qualify for jobs at the now-
higher minimum wage. Second, the opportunity cost of schooling, which might result in an above-
minimum wage job, is lower. Of course if expected earnings in the minimum wage sector increase, then 
the opportunity cost of schooling rises and enrollments may fall.
27 However, the minimum wage can also 
change the wage structure. If there is a relative increase in the demand for more-skilled labor, then the 
price of more-educated labor should rise, which may encourage some youths to stay in school. But 
account must also be taken of the effect of the minimum wage in raising the wage of employed youths 
who have left school, so that the net effect of a minimum wage increase could be to lower the return to an 
extra year of schooling, at the relevant margin.
28  
The relatively recent evidence on the effects of minimum wages on schooling of teenagers in the 
United States unambiguously points to negative effects. Card (1992) reports a significant negative 
difference-in-difference estimate of the California minimum wage increase in 1988 on the teenage 
enrollment rate, with or without demographic controls. Neumark and Wascher (1995) estimate a model of 
minimum wage effects on employment as well as enrollment, and find that a higher minimum wage leads 
                                                 
27 Another possibility is that teenagers are myopic, and put too much emphasis on the potential higher earnings in 
the minimum wage sector following a minimum wage increase with insufficient attention to the cost in terms of 
foregone higher earnings from more education.  





to little change in the proportion enrolled but not employed, a significant negative effect on the proportion 
enrolled and employed (elasticity of −.47), a weak positive effect on the proportion not enrolled but 
employed (elasticity of .14), and a significant positive effect on the proportion idle (elasticity of .64). 
These estimates imply a negative effect of the minimum wage on the proportion enrolled in school. In 
updated estimates for a later sample period and using a better enrollment measure, Neumark and Wascher 
(2003) find robust evidence of negative effects of minimum wages on teenage enrollments. As 
confirmatory evidence, this negative effect was present for observations in states with compulsory 
schooling ages less than 18 (where teenagers have more choice about leaving school), but not in states 
with a compulsory schooling age of 18 (for which the estimates were smaller and insignificant, although 
still negative). Similar results are reported in Chaplin et al. (2003), based on data on the entire population 
of public schools in the United States.  
The evidence on minimum wages and skills is significant because policymakers should perhaps 
be more concerned with how minimum wages affect long-run earnings than with their effects on young 
adult and especially teen employment, especially with respect to promoting economic self-sufficiency. 
Reductions in training (if they occur) and schooling likely reduce longer-run earnings, as may foregone 
labor market experience stemming from disemployment effects of minimum wages for young individuals. 
Moreover, these effects would not be reflected only in employment. For example, workers exposed to a 
high minimum but remaining employed may receive less training.  
To assess the overall effects of these longer-run influences, Neumark and Nizalova (2007) 
estimate the effects of exposure to higher minimum wages at younger ages—when minimum wages were 
most likely to be binding—on outcomes for somewhat older individuals (25-29 year-olds). The estimates 
indicate that adults exposed to minimum wages as teens or young adults subsequently have lower wages 
and earnings. The effects are not trivial. For example, exposure to the average higher minimum wage (for 
states with above-federal minimum wages) as a teenager is estimated to reduce adult earnings by .8 to 1.8 
percent, and similar exposure as a 20-24 year-old to reduce adult earnings by 1.7 to 2.3 percent. The 




remains to be seen whether other studies reach similar conclusions. In the meantime, however, the 
findings suggest that in terms of boosting economic self-sufficiency in the longer-run, minimum wages 
may be particularly unhelpful, presumably by reducing the accumulation of skills that lead to higher 
earnings as an adult. 
III. Subsidizing Employment  
The minimum wage is often contrasted with the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in discussions 
of policies to increase economic self-sufficiency. The comparison is natural, because the EITC subsidizes 
earnings for low-income working families and creates incentives for employment among families with no 
workers—pursuing much the same goals as suggested by the rhetoric, if not the reality, of minimum 
wages. (Of course it also affects income above and beyond earnings via the direct payments to families 
made under the program.) An alternative approach is to subsidize employers for hiring from particular 
groups of workers. I discuss these in turn. 
III.1. The EITC  
EITC payments are determined by four parameters. The earnings credit establishes a subsidy rate 
for earnings. Currently, the federal credit rate for a family with two or more qualifying children is 40 
percent. There is a maximum benefit level, which for the same type of family was $4,536 (in 2006—this 
is indexed). There is a “plateau,” or an income range over which the maximum benefit remains fixed (in 
2006, from $11,340 to $14,810). And finally, there is a phase-out rate at which the credit is reduced as 
income rises (currently 21.05 percent).
29   
The Earned Income Tax Credit has expanded considerably, along two dimensions. At the federal 
level, the credit rate increased sharply over the 1990s, rising from a rate of 14 percent (with two children) 
in 1990 to 40 percent in 1996, where it has remained since. In addition, a number of states introduced 
their own EITC programs, which typically specify a percentage supplement to the federal EITC that is 
provided to families by the state. The number of states with an EITC rose from seven in 1996 to 19 (plus 
                                                 
29 These parameters determine the level of income at which the credit falls to zero, which was $36,348 in 2006, for a 




the District of Columbia) in 2007.
30   
  The EITC generates a variety of incentives regarding labor supply and other behavior. Good 
surveys are provided by Hoffman and Seidman (2003) and Hotz and Scholz (2003), and the discussion 
here is cursory. Regarding labor supply, for families in the phase-in range (i.e., earning less than the 
maximum credit), theory predicts that the EITC has an unambiguous positive influence on employment, 
because the EITC raises the effective wage, and for those previously non-employed there is only a 
substitution effect and no income effect.
31 Hours effects are more ambiguous. On the phase-in range, 
there are offsetting income and substitution effects. On the plateau, there is only a negative income effect. 
And on the phase-out range, both income and substitution effects create incentives for reduced hours. The 
research is fairly unambiguous in indicating that the EITC boosts employment of single mothers.
32 Hours 
effects for those already working but with somewhat higher income (perhaps a working spouse) appear to 
be modestly negative.  
The implication of these findings is that the EITC is likely to boost the incomes of low-income 
families. Moreover, as the preceding discussion makes clear, the EITC targets low-income families; this 
contrasts sharply with the minimum wage, which of course targets low-wage individuals. Given the weak 
link between the two, we might expect that the EITC is more effective at reducing poverty and helping 
low-income families than is the minimum wage. At the same time, it is important to note that the EITC 
does not target poor families perfectly. Most importantly, the break-even point (at which benefits have 
fallen to zero) occurs well above the poverty line. Part of the reason for this is that if benefits were phased 
out too quickly, stronger labor supply disincentive effects (in terms of hours) would be created. In 
addition, because the EITC is based on income rather than wages, it is possible that it sometimes 
                                                 
30 The 15 states with EITC supplements in 2007 were Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, 
Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin, and the supplemental EITC in those states ranged from 4 to 43 percent. See 
Neumark and Wascher (2007b). In addition, EITC supplements will become effective in 2008 in Louisiana, 
Michigan, and North Carolina.     
31 The usual substitution effect occurs as the higher wage raises the price of leisure and induces more labor supply, 
in the case of those originally non-employed leading some to enter the labor market. The income effect, 
however—which typically induces a labor supply reduction as a result of the higher wage leading to more 
consumption of all normal goods, including leisure—does not have an impact on those originally working zero 
hours. 




subsidizes workers who have high skills but work low hours.
33 In addition, the EITC may not reach 
families with such low incomes that they do not file income tax returns, and they may sometimes 
subsidize higher-income families in which the adults are unmarried but cohabiting, whose joint income if 
they married would make them ineligible. Nonetheless, calculations suggest that the EITC targets 
reasonably well—with very few dollars going to families in excess of twice the poverty line (Liebman, 
1998) and nearly one-half of payments going to poor families (Scholz, 1994)—although these 
calculations are based on simulated policy effects rather than before-and-after analyses. 
Neumark and Wascher (2001b) use CPS data to estimate the distributional effects of the EITC. 
The study estimates how changes in the EITC affect transitions into and out of poverty (and among other 
income-to-needs categories); we exploit state policy variation, captured in the credit rate in the phase-in 
range, which varies by year and state, and with the number of children. It would be unsurprising if the 
EITC lifts families out of poverty when we include both earnings and EITC payments. However, we  
forego using estimated EITC payments (and other transfers), and instead just study earned income, and 
hence ask, for example, whether increased generosity of the EITC raises the probability that a family 
earns its way out of poverty. Such evidence would suggest that the incentives created (and not only the 
checks written) because of the EITC are pro-work and anti-poverty. Indeed, the evidence suggests that 
increases in EITC generosity raise the probability that family earnings rise to above the poverty level, and 
also raise the earnings, on average, of families with children that are initially below the poverty line.
34 In 
contrast, there is no effect of pushing near-poor families into poverty (based on earnings), stemming from 
adverse effects on hours or on earnings of those initially near-poor. The estimates imply that the average 
increase in the federal credit rate over the sample period (4 percent) reduces the poverty rate by about 
.029, or nearly 3 percentage points.
35   
Given our conclusions regarding minimum wages, it is fairly clear that the EITC has better 
                                                 
33 For this reason, MaCurdy (2004) considers EITC alternatives that target low-wage workers. These alternatives are 
discussed more in the concluding section.      
34 This evidence emerges in specifications that rely on the state-level variation in EITC parameters. In the paper, we 
argue that federal variation is confounded with other policy changes. Grogger (2003) reports confirming evidence, 
finding that higher EITC payments increase employment, hours, and earnings of female-headed households.   
35 This effect is perhaps a little implausibly large. As reported in the paper, we find that the effect tapers off 




beneficial distributional effects than the minimum wage, and direct comparisons in Neumark and 
Wascher (2001b) affirm this conclusion. The Wu et al. study (2006a) also compares the distributional 
effects of minimum wages and the EITC, as well as other policies, including income tax rates, 
unemployment insurance, SSI, AFDC, Disability Insurance, and Food Stamps. Their evidence points 
quite strongly to the conclusion that the maximum EITC benefit reduces inequality. Interestingly, though, 
they find statistically significant negative effects of the EITC benefit on inequality for all specifications 
except variants of the Atkinson index that place relatively more weight on the low end of the income 
distribution, which the authors suggest occurs because most of the benefits of the EITC actually accrue to 
families on the plateau and in the phase-out range. And for those families with no workers for whom the 
EITC does not induce employment, the EITC of course delivers no benefits, which is of course a potential 
shortcoming of the policy.
36,37  
Finally, a few other issues merit comment. First, even the evidence that finds beneficial 
distributional effects of the EITC points out that for the very bottom of the family income distribution, the 
EITC may not be effective, although that is almost surely true of the minimum wage as well. That is, both 
of these policies aim to raise incomes of those who work—although one encourages employment and one 
may have the unintended effect of reducing it. But other policies—more likely focused on disability—are 
needed to address the income needs of families with no workers or workers facing work limitations.  
Second, as pointed out by Horrigan and Mincy (1993), among others, the EITC offers virtually no 
                                                 
36 Wu et al. conclude that higher marginal tax rates have larger beneficial redistributional effects than the EITC. 
They find adverse effects of AFDC and Food Stamps, which they attribute to work disincentives. They also find 
that a higher phase-out rate increases inequality for nearly every inequality measure. That makes sense because, 
all else the same, a higher phase-out rate reduces income among moderate-income families and induces lower 
labor supply. 
37 Gunderson and Ziliak (2004) find mixed evidence on the distributional effects of the EITC. Their evidence is 
more consistent with the EITC increasing the poverty rate, using the before- or after-tax measure (the latter 
incorporates the credit), although only some of the estimates are statistically significant. For the squared poverty 
gap, with the before-tax measure there are no significant effects of the EITC, whereas for the after-tax measure 
there is some evidence consistent with a reduction in the gap, although curiously this emerges for married-couple 
families, which is unexpected. Their specification may be problematic because it does not appear to allow the 
effects of the EITC and other policies to vary with the number of children in the family, which in Neumark and 
Wascher (2001b) appeared to be quite important. They use the difference between the logs of the state and federal 
maximum EITC benefit, although it is not clear for what type of family, or whether this is averaged over families 
in each state-year cell. 
Formby et al. (2005) carry out a simulation study of the distributional effects of the EITC as well as the minimum 
wage and another policy alternative. Problems with these sorts of studies, and this particular study, are discussed 




benefits to unrelated individuals (the current maximum credit is around $400, for those aged 25-64). From 
a distributional perspective, we may be particularly concerned with increasing economic self-sufficiency 
among families with children. However, recent work has suggested reasons why we may want to consider 
expanding the EITC to single unrelated individuals, even if this policy seems “counterintuitive” (Berlin, 
2007) from the perspective of past anti-poverty efforts. These arguments are considered in more detail in 
the concluding section of this chapter, which considers more fully alternatives to the policies already in 
place.    
Third, I have posed the discussion so far in terms of comparing the minimum wage to the EITC 
as alternative policies to increase earnings. There are arguments suggesting that this “either/or” 
comparison is inappropriate, and that instead the minimum wage and the EITC may be complementary, 
with one making the other more effective. One such argument is that a higher minimum wage may reduce 
the distortionary impact of the EITC on labor supply. In particular, a higher minimum wage enables a 
family to achieve the same level of income (earnings plus EITC) at the maximum EITC credit with a 
smaller EITC payment. This, in turn, allows a lower marginal tax rate over the phase-out range of the 
credit, which could reduce the associated labor supply disincentives (Blank and Schmidt, 2001). This 
argument and others about interactions between the minimum wage and the EITC are discussed in detail 
in Neumark and Wascher (2007b). Some of the evidence quite indirectly suggests that a higher minimum 
wage might under some conditions enhance the positive distributional effects of the EITC. This is an 
intriguing possibility. However, the evidence is preliminary, and more research (currently under way) is 
needed to try to better establish the effects of minimum wage-EITC interactions. But it is worth 
emphasizing that this is one potential line of argument that could, depending on the results, lead me to a 
more positive assessment of the distributional effects of minimum wages under some conditions.       
III.2. Wage Subsidies to Employers 
  The EITC subsidizes employment by adding to workers’ or families’ income an amount based on 
employment, hours worked, and the wage. Over the phase-in range, and with respect to the employment 




United States has more limited experience, is employer-based wage subsidies—that is, making payments 
to employers for employing particular groups of workers. Although there is not a great deal of research on 
wage subsidies, evidence on their effectiveness has been reviewed by Katz (1998), who also presents 
some new evidence. And the two alternative approaches to subsidizing employment have been contrasted 
by Dickert-Conlin and Holtz-Eakin (2000).  
A couple of key issues arise with using employer-based wage subsidies. First, the target group 
has to be identified. In principle, the targeting can be narrowly defined to improve upon that generated by 
the EITC, although of course simply targeting low-wage workers would run into the same distributional 
problems as with the minimum wage.
38 In the United States, wage subsidies have alternatively targeted 
hiring of young disadvantaged workers (Job Opportunities in the Business Sector, or JOBS), AFDC 
recipients (Work Incentives Tax Credit, or WINTC), and low-wage workers (New Jobs Tax Credit, or 
NJTC).
39 The Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC) targeted these groups and others, and was in effect from 
1979 through 1994, before being replaced by the WOTC, which similarly targets multiple groups.
40 
Under the Job Training and Partnership Act (JTPA), there were temporary wage subsidies to firms 
providing long-term employment for recipients of on-the-job training. This was the key wage su
economically disadvantaged adults who are not on welfare. JTPA was replaced by the Workforce 
Investment Act (WIA) in 2000, which does not include wage subsidies. Both reviews of wage subsidies 
concur that the evidence suggests that narrow targeting is problematic, stigmatizing the intended 
beneficiaries and consequently making employers less likely to hire them (or at least dissipating the 
effects of the subsidies). For example, Katz discusses an experimental program in Dayton, Ohio, under 
the TJTC, for welfare recipients. The two groups that received vouchers to present to employers 
indicating their eligibility were less likely to find employment than a third group of job seekers that did 
not receive vouchers, but technically had the same eligibility.  
bsidy for 
                                                 
38 And Dickert-Conlin and Holtz-Eakin (2000) present evidence that offering wage subsidies for low-skill workers is 
also not particularly effective at targeting poor families.  
39 The NJTC did not target specific workers, but rather new employment. But it created stronger incentives to hire 
low-wage workers by applying only to the first $4,200 of wages per employee (in 1977 and 1978).  




The second issue is program design. In particular, employer-based wage subsidy programs can 
create strong unintended incentive effects. If the subsidy seeks to have the most impact on generating new 
employment, then in some way it has to identify and reward either net (positive) changes in employment 
that would not have otherwise occurred, or new hires directly. The latter approach can create incentives 
for churning employees.
41 The former approach may not create incentives for churning, but it imposes the 
need for a good deal of information from firms (to try to determine, based on some rule, what 
employment would have been otherwise). In addition, this approach can generate incentives for 
employment variation (since increases are subsidized but reductions are not penalized). A simpler scheme 
can simply subsidize all employment (perhaps in targeted groups), but this would reward employers in 
large part for what they are doing already (“windfalls”), and hence entail much greater expense and likely 
less impact. In general, any employer-based subsidy is likely to be rather complicated, both in terms of 
identifying eligible workers and determining the subsidy paid to firms. As a consequence, subsidies entail 
serious administrative constraints on firms. These constraints likely explain the very low utilization of 
employer-based wage subsidies when they have been implemented.  
  How do wage subsidies compare with the EITC, which effectively pays workers to subsidize their 
employment (and hours)? In the simplest textbook world, the wage and employment effects of a wage 
subsidy do not depend on whether the subsidy is paid to employees or employers. However, as Dickert-
Conlin and Holtz-Eakin emphasize, things are more complicated. In addition to the fact that the EITC is 
not a simple wage subsidy, they emphasize factors that likely diminish the effectiveness of wage 
subsidies, in particular. One issue is that of stigma, already discussed, which implies that any wage 
subsidy is less effective than the “posted” subsidy because of the negative information it may convey 
about potential employees. The EITC does not have stigma effects, since the employer typically has no 
idea whether an employee is eligible for or receiving the EITC,
42 and it has good but, as noted, not ideal 
                                                 
41 However, Hamersma (2005a) summarizes a 2001 GAO report suggesting little evidence of such churning, as very 
few workers receiving subsidies stayed long enough to get the maximum subsidy, and hiring and training costs 
appeared to render such a strategy cost ineffective.   
42 Many researchers have noted that most EITC recipients choose to take their payment as a lump sum at the end of 
the year rather than in each paycheck. It is conceivable that part of the explanation for this is the avoidance of 




targeting. Wage subsidies that do not target specific groups, but instead subsidize only an initial amount 
of wages, reduce stigma, although of course the targeting then worsens.  
A second issue is administrative and compliance costs. As already noted, these can be substantial 
for employer subsidies. The EITC, on the other hand, is easily administered through the tax code, 
although there is a sizable potential cost from fraudulent claims associated with claiming children on tax 
returns when they did not in fact reside with the filer for the half of the year required by the law. 
  The simplest model also breaks down when we consider incentives on the extensive 
(employment) versus intensive (hours) margin. A program that does more on the extensive margin likely 
delivers more of the intended impact, but Dickert-Conlin and Holtz-Eakin suggest that employer subsidies 
may have more impact on the intensive margin, for which they suggest that supply is less elastic and 
demand more elastic, in which case more of the benefits of the subsidy go to employers.   
Despite problems with employer-based wage subsidies, Katz (1998) presents some evidence 
indicating that the TJTC did boost employment of disadvantaged youths, and discusses evidence 
indicating positive and persistent program impacts from JTPA when the training was combined with job 
search assistance, especially for adult female welfare recipients. This leads him to conclude that wage 
subsidies combined with training and job development assistance can help disadvantaged adults, but 
based on the evidence on stigma and low utilization, to express more skepticism (while still suggesting 
modest benefits) of other narrowly-targeted, stand-alone programs. In more recent evidence on the 
WOTC, Hamersma (2005b) concludes that any employment effects are small, if they exist at all, and are 
hard to establish based on the existing evidence. She does find positive effects on earnings (of around 10 
percent), although only on the job paying the credit, and not over the course of the year after starting this 
subsidized job. Dickert-Conlin and Holtz-Eakin (2000) favor the EITC over wage subsidies, based on 
evidence on the positive labor supply and poverty-reducing effects of the EITC, as well as the limited 
evidence of effectiveness and utilization of employer-based subsidies.  
I would suggest that we do not yet have sufficient evidence on the impact (and costs) of wage 




cautious. However, based on the considerations discussed here, it seems that there is little compelling 
basis for preferring employer- to employee-based subsidies, unless we can identify not only effective 
employer-based wage subsidy programs, but also demonstrate that for particular groups they may be more 
effective than the EITC, or enhance the positive benefits of the EITC. Note that some of the evidence 
Katz discusses suggests possible cases like these, in particular marginalized groups such as disadvantaged 
adults in need of training, or welfare recipients. (This echoes some of the concerns raised earlier regarding 
the inability of the EITC to provide much benefit at the bottom end, as it delivers no benefits to the non-
employed.) His suggestion that employer-based wage subsidies appear most promising when combined 
with other job-related services may point to the need for particular interventions to provide training and 
job skills to those for whom simply strengthening financial incentives to work may not be enough.  
IV. Improving School-to-Work Transitions 
  I now turn to discuss public policy that seeks to improve earnings and hence economic self-
sufficiency through increasing skills. As noted in the Introduction, my discussion focuses on school-to-
work policies. Because school-to-work policies are, by construction, effective mainly for young people, 
an important element omitted from this discussion is efforts to increase skills among adults already in the 
labor market. As already noted, there is an extensive literature on training programs, some targeted on 
adults. Although I do not discuss the training literature in any detail, it is worth pointing out that evidence 
compiled in that literature tends to find that traditional job training programs have some beneficial effects 
in terms of increasing earnings for disadvantaged adults, but quite limited effectiveness for less-
advantaged youths.
43 This may provide an additional motivation for focusing on school-to-work 
programs, as an alternative and possibly more effective means of intervening with teenagers to increase 
skills and thus earnings.  
  
                                                 
43 Heckman et al. (1999) provide an extensive review of the literature documenting this general result, from data for 
both the United States and Europe. (See also the brief summary in Holzer (2007), who concurs with this summary 
of the findings from the literature on training programs.) Heckman et al. summarize cost-benefit calculations 
indicating that training programs for adults sometimes appear to deliver positive social returns. Recent evidence 
from evaluations of the Job Corps program appear to indicate gains for 20-24 years olds, but not those younger 




IV.1. School-to-Work Background and Policies 
School-to-work policies were encouraged to reduce the “churning” or “milling about” 
experienced by some youths in the United States upon their entry into the labor market, reflected in initial 
periods of joblessness or a series of “dead-end” jobs (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1990). Researchers 
and others advocated that the United States adopt a more orderly school-to-work system, like that of the 
German apprenticeship system or the informal contracts between Japanese schools and employers (e.g., 
Commission on the Skills of the American Workforce, 1990; Hamilton, 1990). This policy debate 
provided much of the impetus for the 1994 School-to-Work Opportunities Act (STWOA), which 
provided $1.5 billion in federal funding to support the creation of an integrated system of youth 
education, job training, and labor market information, to provide a faster and more successful transition 
from school to stable employment in higher-paying jobs.
44 In addition, school-to-work practitioners and 
advocates commonly argue that school-to-work programs like those encouraged by the STWOA are 
especially helpful for the “forgotten half”—the non-college bound among whom the less-advantaged are 
concentrated. However, in studying school-to-work programs it is important not to focus solely on the 
STWOA. As described in more detail in Neumark (2007, Chapter 1), school-to-work policies culminating 
in the STWOA developed from a rather long history of policies addressing the school-to-work transition. 
What distinguishes the STWOA is its efforts to integrate academic and vocational education for the 
traditional target audience of those bound for at most two-year degrees and those bound for four-year 
colleges and universities (Cohen and Besharov, 2002).
45 A second effort toward integrating academic and 
vocational skills was the development of “career academies,” which are “schools within schools” that 
integrate academics with general job readiness and preparation in a particular career area.  
The STWOA was not re-authorized after its initial five years, and the federal effort was 
                                                 
44 The federal funding was intended to serve as seed money to establish school-to-work transition systems that 
included formal partnerships among secondary and post-secondary institutions and employers. Research has 
established that in many states the legislation did spur the development of such systems (see, e.g., Hershey et al., 
1999; Neumark and Allen, 2003; Neumark, 2006). 
45 In contrast, vocational education (later called career and technical education) was characterized by its isolation 
from more comprehensive high school curricula (Hayward and Benson, 1993), while Tech Prep pursued limited 
integration of vocational and academic education by introducing some vocational education into comprehensive 
high school curricula while sequencing vocational education during high school with two years of further related 




essentially abandoned by the Bush Administration in favor of No Child Left Behind (NCLB), which 
emphasizes measurable academic outcomes and assigns a central role to standardized testing in grades K-
12. Although educational reforms focusing on school quality can be viewed as seeking to enhance labor 
market success via better educational preparation, there is some basis for questioning whether test-based 
reforms do as much to prepare students for careers and improve school-to-work transitions as do school-
to-work efforts, especially for the forgotten half. This section of the chapter addresses the effectiveness of 
school-to-work efforts in improving prospects for economic self-sufficiency. A comparison of school-to-
work efforts and test-based educational reforms is more challenging and is not taken up here.   
IV.2. The Effects of School-to-Work 
IV.2.a. Earlier Research  
Stern et al. (1995) provide a thorough compendium of earlier research on school-to-work 
programs. The research summarized in that volume offers little persuasive evidence of positive impacts of 
these programs on adult labor market outcomes. First, few studies have focused on labor market outcomes 
more than a year or two after completion of the programs, and those that do provide limited evidence that 
over a period of a few years beneficial effects of some types of school-to-work programs dissipate, as 
comparison group members find good jobs on their own. Second, many of these studies do not construct a 
reasonable comparison group, let alone consider the problem of selection into programs on the basis of 
unobserved characteristics that might also be correlated with outcomes. Third, even those studies that 
attempt to construct a good comparison group find no beneficial short-term labor market effects, with the 
possible exception of those students who remained with the employer with whom they “apprenticed” 
during the program. Finally, some of the evidence suggests that school-to-work programs may discourage 
post-secondary education.  
A major report on the STWOA by Mathematica (Hershey et al. 1999) did little to advance our 
understanding of program impacts; in fact, the main goal of this report was not to provide a program 
evaluation. Nonetheless, the report does present some evidence that is intended to speak to the effects of 




school-to-work programs are employed in a wider array of industries and receive more training than other 
students in paid positions, and concludes that “Schools develop positions in a wide range of industries, 
increasing the chances that students can work in a setting relevant to their career interests” (p. 89). 
However, nothing in the evidence implies that students who found these jobs as part of school-to-work 
programs would not have found the same types of jobs absent such programs; students most likely to do 
so may simply have sorted into school-to-work programs. Students do, however, report that school-to-
work activities helped them sharpen their career goals; whether this translates into concrete gains was not 
addressed. Paralleling this view of the earlier evidence, a subsequent survey of published academic 
research on school-to-work across the United States generally supported the claim that little progress had 
been made in estimating the causal effects of school-to-work programs (Hughes et al., 2001).  
IV.2.b. Evidence from the 1997 NLSY 
The new National Longitudinal Survey of Youth begun in 1997 (NLSY97), offers researchers 
opportunities to improve significantly upon the existing research. The NLSY97 covers respondents who 
were in high school during the period in which the STWOA was in effect, and surveys individuals about 
“programs schools offer to help students prepare for the world of work.” The school-to-work programs 
covered in the NLSY97 include: job shadowing; mentoring (matching students to an individual in an 
occupation); cooperative education (combining academic and vocational studies); work in a school-
sponsored enterprise; Tech Prep; and internships or apprenticeships. However, the NLSY97 does not yet 
permit much follow-up as the respondents age into adulthood.   
In two papers with Donna Rothstein (Neumark and Rothstein, 2006, 2007), we explore the 
effectiveness of school-to-work programs using the NSLY97. The analysis in the first paper is based on 
data from the first four rounds of the NLSY97. When the first round was administered, in 1997, 
respondents were aged 12-17. With the second round, we could begin to observe some respondents who 
have left high school, but we get many more such observations with the third and fourth rounds, and 
therefore focus on educational and employment outcomes measured as of the third or fourth rounds (and 




The core empirical framework is estimation, at the individual level, of the relationship between 
employment or enrollment in the post-high-school period, and participation in school-to-work during high 
school. The analysis is based on dichotomous choice models for employment and enrollment; both of 
these activities are considered important to later labor market success, in particular relative to the 
alternative of being neither in school nor employed. We estimate models for employment and enrollment 
outcomes as determined by participation in a number of different school-to-work programs, as well as a 
vector of individual, family, or school-level controls.  
However, this research has to confront the potential for endogenous selection into school-to-work 
participation. For example, individuals with the highest expectations of work after high school may 
choose to participate in these programs, perhaps because they are more interested in learning about the 
job market. When actual work behavior is observed, then, we would find that those who participated in 
school-to-work have higher employment rates, but the positive relationship between school-to-work 
participation and employment is at least partly non-causal. Alternatively, schools with student populations 
that tend not to go to college may be more likely to offer school-to-work programs and to have students 
with lower college enrollment, in which case, again, the association between school-to-work participation 
and later outcomes might not be causal. A common approach to the endogenous selection problem with 
longitudinal data is to implement a first-difference estimator based on observations before and after 
program participation. But because we are studying program effects on individuals’ first labor market 
experiences, or on further school enrollment of those already enrolled, there are no meaningful 
observations on the outcomes of interest prior to participation, and hence such estimators are inapplicable.  
Instead, we use an extensive set of controls for the factors that might affect the dependent 
variables and also be correlated with school-to-work participation. In addition to standard demographic 
information, the NLSY97 includes data on living arrangements and family structure and income, test 
scores (from the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery, or ASVAB), and self-reported measures of 
school behavior (whether the respondent was threatened at school, or had gotten into a physical fight at 




reported subjective probabilities for future education and employment, including: receipt of a high school 
diploma by age 20; obtaining a four-year college degree by age 30; and working over 20 hours per week 
at age 30. Including these expectations variables can be viewed as mimicking the longitudinal estimator 
that we would like to have, as these controls capture some measures of an individual’s propensity for later 
enrollment or employment prior to participation in school-to-work.
46   
We also found that school offerings of school-to-work programs were correlated with 
characteristics of schools and their student bodies, such as truancy, pregnancy, and alcohol and drug use. 
These associations suggest that if we use individual-level school-to-work participation to identify the 
effects of school-to-work, but the variation in participation stems partly from variation across schools, 
then we may obtain biased estimates. The NLSY97 has one additional feature that we can exploit to 
address this problem. Specifically, there are data on multiple students in the same school, allowing school 
fixed effects to be added to the equations to control for unobserved factors that are common to students 
within a school. Of course, since individuals within schools differ from one another, in the within-school 
estimation attention must still be paid to individual-level heterogeneity. 
Key results are presented in Table 7. As it turns out, the estimates are quite similar across the 
alternative specifications—including just the basic demographic controls, the more detailed ones listed in 
the table, the proxy variables measuring respondents’ work and schooling expectations during high 
school, and the school fixed effects. Consequently, I simply summarize the overall results. Looking first 
at college education, the estimates reveal considerable heterogeneity in the effects of different types of 
school-to-work programs. There is some evidence that job shadowing and mentoring programs are 
associated with a significantly higher likelihood of some college education, and robust evidence of a 
positive effect of school enterprise programs.
47 The estimates are often quite sizable. For example, in 
                                                 
46 As explained in Neumark and Rothstein (2006), these expectations variables can also be interpreted as ideal 
proxies, the inclusion of which may eliminate bias from endogenous selection into school-to-work participation. 
The idea is that any remaining variation in unobservables net of these expectations is only forecast error, which 
should be uncorrelated with the exogenous variables in the information set. 
47 The link between school enterprise and college enrollment is not obvious. However, research by Stern (1984) and 
Stern et al. (1994) reports that enterprise-based jobs are more closely related to students’ education than are out-
of-school jobs, and that enterprise-based jobs provide more opportunity to apply what students are learning in 




Panel A, with the basic controls, the estimated differentials for these programs range from about .07 to 
.11, relative to the sample proportion of .50 with some college; these estimates imply increases of 14 to 
22 percent in the probability of college attendance. On the other hand, Tech Prep programs are associated 
with a significantly lower likelihood of college education. The employment results are more robust across 
specifications and samples, generally pointing to statistically significant positive effects of coop 
programs, with effects near .06 to .10, and also evidence of positive effects of internship/apprenticeship 
programs. Relative to a sample proportion currently employed of .63, the estimates imply that coop 
programs are associated with approximately 10-16 percent increases in the probability of post-high school 
employment, and internship/apprenticeship programs with increases of about 8 to 18 percent.
48   
A key finding is that the school-to-work programs that boost college attendance (job shadowing, 
mentoring, and school enterprise) do not adversely affect employment, and conversely those programs 
that boost employment (coops and internships/apprenticeships) do not reduce college attendance. This 
suggests that, on net, these school-to-work programs increase skill formation; if, in contrast, they tended 
to reduce employment at the expense of enrollment, or vice versa, the conclusions would be more 
ambiguous. The one piece of evidence on school-to-work programs that appears in a more negative light 
is the estimated negative impact of Tech Prep on college enrollment. Paralleling the above discussion, if 
there is any tradeoff with employment so that work increases, this negative enrollment effect might be 
viewed less negatively. It turns out that there is a positive, although only weakly significant, effect of 
Tech Prep on the likelihood of full-time work conditional on employment, which is roughly the same size 
(but opposite sign) as the estimated effect on enrollment. This suggests that the negative effect of Tech 
Prep on schooling is roughly offset by a higher incidence of full-time work. Nonetheless, as the returns to 
schooling in the form of higher wages typically outweigh the returns to experience—and even more so 
with regard to the return to full-time versus part-time experience—it is difficult not to view the negative 
                                                                                                                                                             
experience and therefore encourages higher education. 
48 We found that very few variables were predictive of participation in school-to-work programs; the one important 
exception was that blacks were more likely to participate in coop, school enterprise, and Tech Prep programs. 
These results suggest that there may be little systematic selection into school-to-work programs, which would 




effect of Tech Prep on schooling in a somewhat adverse light. Finally, it bears repeating the reservation 
that these estimates are only suggestive of longer-term beneficial effects; longer-term analyses await more 
data.  
IV.2.c. School-to-Work Programs and the “Forgotten Half” 
Neumark and Rothstein (2007) use the NLSY97 data to explore the differential effects of school-
to-work program participation on disadvantaged and minority youths. The analysis proceeds in two steps. 
First, to operationalize the “forgotten half,” we estimate a reduced form model for attending college. We 
do this without incorporating information on school-to-work participation, to establish the ex ante 
probabilities of college attendance (on the basis of which schools or policymakers might target school-to-
work efforts). We use the estimates of this model to distinguish between those in the top and bottom 
halves of the distribution of the predicted probability of college attendance, interpreting the latter as the 
“forgotten half.”
49 We then estimate regression models for the effects of participation in various school-
to-work programs on a number of post-secondary education- and employment-related outcomes, allowing 
for separate effects of program participation for those in the top and bottom halves of the predicted 
probability of college attendance—in other words, separate effects for the forgotten half. These estimates 
are then used to test which types of school-to-work programs are particularly effective at boosting post-
secondary outcomes for the forgotten half.  
We use the same data as in the earlier paper, but extended through the fifth wave. In addition, we 
explore a richer set of education and work-related outcomes. Because the findings from Neumark and 
Rothstein (2006) suggested little evidence of endogenous selection into school-to-work programs in a 
manner that biases the estimates of program effects, for this analysis the regressions with the detailed 
controls, but without the either the subjective expectations data (available for only a subsample) or school 
fixed effects, were used.  
Table 8 provides a summary of the results. The table displays the estimated signs of effects for 
                                                 
49 Of course this share is not necessarily one-half of the appropriate population. But the “forgotten half” phrase was 
introduced by the William T. Grant Foundation (1988), and this characterization has stuck in subsequent work. 




those in the forgotten half, showing all cases for which the estimates are significantly different from zero 
only for the forgotten half (or significant for both, but with the opposite sign for the forgotten half). The 
estimates are also broken up into those indicating that school-to-work participation increases skills, and 
the opposite case. Thus, the entries in the “skill increasing” panels highlight the school-to-work programs 
that appear to increase schooling, employment, and earnings only for those in the forgotten half.  
Looking first at the results for women, there is little indication of positive effects on schooling-
related outcomes for those in the forgotten half. However, the conclusion is quite different for work-
related outcomes, with the most striking finding that internship/apprenticeship programs appear to be 
particularly effective at boosting wages and earnings for the forgotten half. For men, the situation is 
somewhat different. In general, there is more evidence that school-to-work programs are particularly 
beneficial for the forgotten half. Moreover, there is evidence of beneficial effects on both schooling-
related and work-related outcomes. With regard to schooling, for five of the six programs there is 
evidence of positive effects on education, and for the work-related outcomes, there is particularly strong 
evidence that internship/apprenticeship programs boost employment and decrease idleness among men in 
the forgotten half, with similar results for school enterprise programs. 
Overall, then, there is evidence that school-to-work programs are particularly advantageous for 
men in the forgotten half with respect to both schooling and work-related outcomes, but for women only 
with respect to work-related outcomes. Thus, the combined evidence from the NLSY97 points to some 
beneficial effects of school-to-work programs, and suggests especially for men that there is rather 
compelling evidence that participation in some school-to-work programs increases education and 
employment among the forgotten half.  
IV.2.d. Evidence on Career Academies 
“Career academies” have three elements. First, they combine academic courses that meet college 
entrance requirements and technical classes that relate to a specific theme, which is typically organized 
around an industry such as finance, travel and tourism, public service, or information technology. Second, 




related experiences outside the classroom. Finally, career academies are typically structured so that 
groups of students take the same classes together in each grade, and stay with the same group of teachers 
for at least two years (see Stern, 2007).
50 Career academies can be thought of as relatively intensive 
versions of school-to-work programs, compared to intermittent programs in comprehensive schools.  
Even some recent studies of career academies (Orr et al., 2007; Stern et al., 2007) suffer from two 
problems—an inability to address endogenous selection into these academies, and a lack of data 
following students after they leave high school. Nonetheless, these studies provide descriptive 
information on the content of career academy programs, and some suggestive evidence that career 
academies associated with fields that generally require a college degree may boost college attendance. 
However, the ongoing evaluation of career academies by the Manpower Demonstration Research 
Corporation (Kemple and Snipes, 2000; Kemple, 2001; Kemple, 2004) addresses explicitly the problem 
of endogenous program participation, and includes later labor market outcomes.
51 The strength of this 
study is that it is based on random assignment of students to career academies, as participants were 
chosen randomly from applicants to the career academies in the study, with participants and non-
participants followed for four years (thus far) after leaving high school.  
The most recent report (Kemple, 2004) finds beneficial labor market effects for male participants, 
but not for female participants. For example, for male participants relative to non-participants the 
probability of any employment and full-time employment is higher in each of the four follow-up years, 
with differences of 3.6-11.8 percentage points (mostly significant). Average weekly hours in each year 
are significantly higher, by about 4 hours, the average wage is significantly higher in most years, by about 
$.80 (although less in year 2), and average monthly earnings are higher in most years, by $166-$268 
(significant in all years but year 3, and highest in the last year). There was also some evidence that 
                                                 
50 Kemple (2005) reports that there are approximately 2,500 career academies across the country. He does not report 
any direct enrollment numbers, but suggests that academies typically include 150-200 students. These numbers 
suggest that there are around 440,000 students in career academies, out of approximately 16,000,000 high school 
students. (The latter number comes from Digest of Education Statistics, 
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d04/tables/dt04_002.asp, viewed May 14, 2007; Kemple does not give a date 
(or source) for his estimate.) The National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) reports 4,800 secondary 
schools with career academies, nearly twice Kemple’s estimates (http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/ctes/tables/h14.asp, 
viewed May 14, 2007). However, it is not clear what the differences are in the definitions of career academies.  




participants were in better jobs; as of the last quarter, among those employed, participants were more 
likely to have a health plan, sick leave, paid vacation days, and a retirement plan, although only the 
vacation day differential was significant. Comparing the estimated differences in employment, hours, 
earnings, etc., across each of the four follow-up years, there is no evidence of increasing (or decreasing) 
differentials between the participants and the controls. The earnings differential, for example, is $206 in 
year 1, $202 in year 2, $166 in year 3, and $268 in year 4. The wage, hours, and employment differentials 
are similarly relatively stable. This does raise an interesting question of what the nature of the effect of 
career academies is. The evidence does not point to greater career progress of participants. Rather, the 
differentials that emerge in the first year after leaving high school are largely persistent.  
For women, interestingly, none of these differences emerged. The estimated differences were 
much smaller and statistically insignificant, although the point estimates tended to favor participants over 
non-participants. Kemple points out that the young women in the sample were more likely to have 
children than the young men, with no differences between women who participated and the controls. He 
suggests that the higher incidence of childbearing “may have limited the extent to which the young 
women were able to capitalize on the career development experiences that they had in the career 
academies” (2005, p. 16). Finally, with respect to labor market outcomes, the results indicated that the 
beneficial effects were concentrated on those who came from higher-risk groups, defined as either those 
with a high likelihood of dropping out, based on characteristics measured prior to random assignment, or 
those who were not highly engaged in school.
52  
Of course it is possible that the labor market gains for men could come at the expense of 
schooling, which might deliver more long-run returns. The evidence for men suggests many negative 
differentials for participants relative to non-participants, although only one is significant, for ever 
enrolling in post-secondary education (a 6.8 percentage point differential). Other shortfalls for male 
participants, although none are significant, include completion of a post-secondary credential, receipt of a 
bachelor’s degree, or receipt of a skills training certificate or license; the estimates range from about 2.3 
                                                 




to 4.2 percentage points. Kemple argues that the evidence suggests that the “labor market outcomes for 
young men did not come at the expense of reducing the prospects for post-secondary education” (2005, p. 
21). I am a bit less convinced of this given the sign patterns of the estimates, although clearly in terms of 
statistical significance the evidence of positive labor market effects is stronger. Moreover, as the study 
reports, for the higher-risk group defined in terms of likely drop out, there was a significant negative 
effect on post-secondary educational attainment.
53 For women, there is no evidence of effects on 
education. Given the potential negative schooling effects, it will be important, if possible, to follow up 
participants even later, to see whether the positive effects for male participants decline as non-participants 
leave school, although it is highly unlikely that this could erase the reported gains. 
Finally, one slightly troubling aspect of this study is that the non-academy control group did 
exceptionally well in terms of high school completion. The rates for the treatment and control groups, 
respectively, were 81.3 and 83.3 percent, compared with 61.2 percent in a comparable random sample of 
students in a general curriculum, which Kemple suggests is the group from which academy students 
typically come. (The study does not attempt to provide similar comparisons for the other outcomes it 
covers.) In my view, the high achievement of the control group raises questions about the generalizability 
of this study. In addition, these comparisons put the estimated effects of career academies in perspective, 
suggesting that even though there were significant gains relative to the control group, the gains may have 
been relatively small compared to the low achievement and performance of the general population that 
career academies are intended to help.  
Nonetheless, this study does provide evidence of positive gains from career academy 
participation. The evidence from the MDRC study clearly represents a major addition to the evidence of 
beneficial effects of career academies. It also to some extent parallels the findings from the NLSY97 for 
school-to-work more generally, indicating that school-to-work programs deliver labor market gains for 
                                                 
53 Note that this evidence for men contrasts with the findings in Orr et al. (2007) pointing to positive effects of the 
NAF career academies on four-year college attendance. It is unclear how much this difference is attributable to 
the random assignment, or to differences in the types of academies studied. In particular, Orr et al. suggest that the 
NAF academies cover particular fields (especially finance, which was the type that boosted college attendance), 
and may differ in terms of other program characteristics as well, given that the academies they study were 




disadvantaged men.  
IV.2.e. School-to-Work at Post-Secondary Institutions 
All of the research on school-to-work programs discussed to this point, and most of the existing 
research literature, focuses on high schools. This reflects the policy emphasis. Person and Rosenbaum 
(2007) provide a provocative perspective that suggests that this policy emphasis should be at least 
partially redirected. In particular, they begin by arguing that linkages between high schools and labor 
markets are relatively weak, with employers having little regard for high school achievement, and high 
school staff having little trust of or interaction with employers. Of course school-to-work programs seek 
to change this. Nonetheless, echoing Grubb (2001), among others, Person and Rosenbaum emphasize the 
potentially important role played by community colleges, and occupational colleges in particular, in the 
workplace preparation of lower-skilled adults. Person and Rosenbaum point out that many students enter 
post-secondary education, with nearly half of these at community colleges. This fact, coupled with the 
occupational focus of many community colleges, based in part on the ability of these local institutions to 
collaborate with local employers and government, suggests that we should look to community colleges as 
playing a potentially important role in the school-to-work transition.    
Person and Rosenbaum’s research seeks to explore the role of two-year post-secondary 
institutions in creating linkages between school and work. Much of their focus is on differences between 
private occupational colleges and public community colleges, which is potentially informative about what 
the latter institutions might do better. More generally, this work can be viewed to some extent as testing 
the idea that these institutions are a potentially fertile ground for policy efforts focused on the school-to-
work transition. The authors provide a mixed qualitative and quantitative study of labor market linkages 
among faculty at two-year colleges, comparing seven public community colleges and seven private 
occupational colleges; the latter are hardly representative, and may instead point to “best practices” at 
such schools.  
The qualitative evidence from interviews of program chairs points to a number of dimensions 




there are formal responsibilities for labor market linkages at the public community colleges. These 
include greater contact and integration between faculty/teaching and career services, greater involvement 
with advisory committees of local employers, fewer bureaucratic obstacles to changing curriculum to 
respond to new developments, more individualized and intensive job placement efforts, and a mission 
more focused on workforce training rather than general education and transfer to four-year colleges.  
Analysis of data from a survey of over 4,000 students at these colleges tries to examine 
quantitatively whether labor market linkages on the part of teachers or the institutions (as perceived by 
students) had beneficial effects. Person and Rosenbaum found that labor market linkages are greater at 
private colleges, and lead to increased effort in school and greater confidence about degree completion. 
This conclusion is reinforced by evidence from national samples that job placement services at private 
community colleges are positively associated with degree attainment. Clearly more evidence is needed of 
the actual effects of school-to-work type interventions at two-year and community colleges. But this work 
points to potential importance of focusing policy efforts on two-year colleges in addition to high schools. 
And one critical question is how two-year and community colleges can better contribute to improving 
skills among adults already in the labor market. 
V. Conclusions and Discussion of Policy Options Moving Forward 
This chapter does not consider all of the labor market policies that could potentially improve 
economic self-sufficiency via increasing earnings. It focuses on mandated wage floors, the EITC and 
wage subsidies, and school-to-work programs. It excludes key issues such as welfare reform, training, and 
education reform including early childhood investments, without in any way suggesting that these are less 
important.  
The policies I examine can each be considered in the context of a simple supply and demand 
analysis. A minimum wage mandates a movement up the labor demand curve, toward higher wages and 
lower employment. This policy clearly presents a tradeoff between higher wages and lower employment, 
unless the labor demand curve is perfectly inelastic. The EITC pays subsidies to workers to increase 




the market wage, but increasing the combined wage including the EITC (as long as the supply curve 
slopes upward and the demand curve downward). Wage subsidies instead subsidize hiring by employers, 
shifting the demand curve out and also raising employment and the wage (part of which is paid in the 
form of the subsidy). And finally school-to-work policies aim to increase productivity, also shifting the 
demand curve out and raising wages and employment. Even in a simple textbook setting, it is unclear 
which of these policies will do the most to increase income. And once a more realistic view is adopted, 
with heterogeneous workers who can be affected differently by the alternative policies, predictions about 
which policies will work become even more complicated, as questions of who gains and loses, and by 
how much, come to the fore. What are the main conclusions from the empirical analysis of each of these 
policies? 
First, the minimum wage is an ineffective policy to promote economic self-sufficiency through 
higher earnings. It reduces employment of the least-skilled individuals it is trying to help. That, in itself, 
does not imply that minimum wages do not on net help. The more telling evidence is that minimum 
wages do not deliver beneficial distributional effects to poor or near-poor families, and may make them 
worse off. In addition, they appear to have deleterious longer-run effects on earnings, presumably through 
reducing the accumulation of skills. Putting the case succinctly but strongly, it is extraordinarily difficult 
to discern any case for higher federal or state minimums in order to improve economic self-sufficiency.  
Do these conclusions imply that I advocate discontinuing the minimum wage? I do not, mainly 
because the data from which I estimate the effects of minimum wages concern small changes, and hence 
simply do not support inferences about the effects of large policy changes. By the same token, however, 
the generally harmful effects I find from small increases in the minimum wage suggest that the target 
population would be better served by slow erosion of the minimum wage, at least over a modest range, 
which to a large extent is what has happened since about 1980.   
Interestingly, though, living wages, which target different workers, present a more favorable 
tradeoff. They still entail disemployment effects, but appear to deliver more beneficial distributional 




coverage of living wage laws would take us into the territory of minimum wages, with their concomitant 
adverse effects. Moreover, even if the findings on living wages might imply that at much higher levels 
minimum wages could have some beneficial distributional effects, the costs of raising the wage floor from 
current levels of minimum wages to the much higher levels typical of living wages could be very high.   
Labor supply incentives, in particular the EITC, appear effective. There seems fairly compelling 
evidence that a more generous EITC boosts employment of single mothers and in so doing raises incomes 
and earnings of low-income families. Wage subsidies are the flip side of trying to strengthen employment 
incentives, but provide the incentives to employers rather than employees. There is some evidence that 
these subsidies increase employment and earnings. (Certainly if I am convinced that employment for the 
low-skilled falls in response to a higher minimum wage, I should also think that subsidizing wages boosts 
employment.) However, as Dickert-Conlin and Holtz-Eakin (2000) emphasize, problems of 
stigmatization resulting from eligibility for wage subsidy programs can offset some of the gains. On the 
other hand, coupling such programs with training and job search assistance may reduce problems 
associated with stigma and hence increase the benefits of wage subsidies. Another possible means to 
avoid stigmatization is to pay the subsidy to workers instead of to firms (Scholz, 2007)—a policy more 
like the EITC but based only on low wages.
54 Assuming that the low effectiveness of existing subsidy 
programs is principally due to low participation by firms, but that the effects of a wage subsidy paid to 
employees would parallel those estimated for the EITC, the employment effect could be sizable (Scholz, 
2007).  
Wage subsidies paid to employees are worth considering. At present, though, there does not seem 
to be a great deal of political support for expanding wage subsidies. Moreover, a major effort in this 
direction entails substantial administrative difficulties. Thus, it may be that increasing the generosity of 
the EITC for unrelated individuals is a more realistic option for further extending subsidies to 
employment, especially if the goal is to increase earnings (and incomes) among those not currently 
                                                 
54 Scholz proposes targeting lower-income families with this subsidy by restricting eligibility to individuals living in 
federally-designated Renewal Communities, Empowerment Zones, or Enterprise Communities. However, his 




eligible for the EITC. 
One argument for extending the EITC to individuals is to offset some presumed adverse 
consequences of lower earnings for the less advantaged—including declining employment rates—
stemming in large part from the long-run increase in wage inequality (Berlin, 2007). Berlin also points out 
that there have been declines in marriage and increases in out-of-wedlock childbearing and childrearing, 
and that these changes may have been caused in part by declining earnings of men making them less 
attractive marriage partners. Berlin argues—and the proposal has been embraced by others, including at 
least one presidential candidate in the campaign for the 2008 election
55—that rising earnings from an 
expanded EITC might therefore deliver benefits in addition to direct income, including higher marriage 
rates, decreased relative attractiveness of illicit sources of income, etc. In addition, Gitterman et al. (2007) 
suggest that an expanded EITC for individuals without qualifying children would also recognize that 
many non-custodial parents have responsibility for children, especially in light of high out-of-wedlock 
childbearing and divorce rates. 
There is evidence that declining wages for less-skilled men have reduced employment (e.g., Juhn, 
1992). Consistent with this evidence, Berlin (2007) cites evidence from experimental evaluations of 
programs offering earnings supplements to low-wage workers conditional on working 30 hours or more 
per week, which points to positive effects on earnings (net of the income supplement). However, most of 
the evidence pertains to single mothers. One program offered supplements to single men (the New Hope 
community group in Milwaukee), and it generally produced positive effects on employment, earnings, 
and family income of men, even up to five years after the program, although many of the estimated 
effects are not significant (Duncan et al., 2007). However, regarding the broader link between higher 
earnings and the encouragement of marriage and discouragement of crime, the evidence is certainly more 
sparse. Scholz (2007), who also advocates making the EITC for unrelated individuals more generous, 
discusses some of the research linking lower wages to higher crime and lower marriage rates, while 
acknowledging that this evidence is fairly limited, especially in the case of marriage. Finally, there 
                                                 




appears to be no evidence on how an expanded EITC for individuals might translate into more resources 
for children of non-custodial parents. Clearly, though, if such a policy would lead to major reductions in 
crime, for example, then the benefits could outweigh the costs, as Scholz (2007) argues.   
However, a number of issues arise in considering this policy option. To begin, it is useful to think 
about how the EITC affects wages and the margins on which it operates in order to try to clarify who 
might gain and lose from an expanded EITC. The current EITC boosts employment among those who 
would not work in its absence, increasing competition with those already in the labor market and reducing 
the market wage for low-skilled workers.
56 Indeed, Rothstein (2007) reports such evidence. Aside from 
implying that employers get some of the gains from an expanded EITC, this evidence also points to some 
important considerations with regard to expanding the EITC for unrelated individuals. The implication is 
that if expanding the EITC for unrelated individuals would bring more such individuals into the labor 
market—which is part of the argument (Berlin, 2007; Gitterman et al., 2007)—then this would lower low-
skilled wages, potentially shifting some of the benefits of the EITC program as a whole away from 
families as the eligible participants with children face increased labor supply from unrelated individuals, 
while at the same time encouraging employment and increasing earnings and income among less-skilled 
men who are not in families. There may be an argument for shifting the benefits of the EITC in this way, 
but if so this should be made explicit, rather than suggesting that we can simply do more to increase 
incomes at the bottom of the distribution by extending the EITC to unrelated individuals, with no 
tradeoffs. On the other hand, if it can be established that an expanded EITC for unrelated individuals has 
substantial impacts on the employment margin, the potential benefits from returns to labor market 
experience that eventually lead to increased earnings and reduced reliance on the EITC might prove a 
substantial boon to economic self-sufficiency.
57 Also, if the unrelated individuals who are the target of 
proposals to expand the EITC are already working, an expanded EITC would likely reduce their labor 
                                                 
56 It is also worth pointing out, in relating the literature on minimum wage employment effects to the EITC, that the 
less elastic one thinks the demand for low-skilled labor is, the more one would expect wages for low-skilled 
workers to fall in response to an expanded EITC.   
57 This is speculative, but is in some sense the flip-side of the results in Neumark and Nizalova (2007) suggesting 





supply but increase their total income (earnings plus EITC), and this reduction in labor supply would 
increase low-skilled wages, likely benefiting other EITC recipients as well. 
It is also useful to think about the main goals of expanding the EITC for unrelated individuals, 
and asking whether doing so is likely to be the most efficient policy option. In particular, to the extent that 
social goals relating to marriage and child support figure prominently in proposals for a more generous 
EITC for unrelated individuals, it may make more sense to try to directly reduce some of the incentives of 
the EITC with respect to marriage and to pursue other measures to increase support of unmarried parents 
for children, as it seems at least possible that “buying” changes in these behaviors through an expanded 
EITC for unrelated individuals might prove very inefficient. The same argument could be made about 
crime, although I admit that arguments that we need to do more to increase the costs of crime, rather than 
trying to increase the benefits of participating in the licit economy, seem far-fetched in the current U.S. 
context of massive incarceration.   
Aside from the idea of extending the EITC to unrelated individuals, there have also been 
proposals to structure the EITC differently, to focus on low-wage workers (MaCurdy, 2004). As noted 
earlier, part the motivation for this structure is to try to reduce the labor supply disincentives associated 
with the EITC for higher-income families that are still eligible. But this idea is also intended to better 
target families with low-wage workers that cannot, even with full-time work, achieve an acceptable 
standard of living, and to increase work incentives. MaCurdy discusses two options: a “wage-based” 
EITC that pays a share of the maximum EITC benefit based on the share of full-time work in a family; 
and a “wage-subsidy” EITC that pays the difference between a target wage and the worker’s (lower) 
market wage, multiplied by hours worked (averaged for the family). In the context of state add-ons to the 
federal EITC (in data for California), he finds that the wage-based policy provides similar incentives and 
benefits for low-wage workers, but greater work incentives for higher-wage workers, while lowering 
expenses by reducing benefits for families with high-wage and part-time workers, and that the wage-
subsidy policy targets families with low-wage workers, and provides stronger work incentives. As 




because of the necessity of measuring family labor supply. Nonetheless, these ideas for modifying the 
EITC merit further consideration because of their potential for boosting earnings among low-income 
families.   
Finally, a new but growing literature on school-to-work provides some support for the potential 
benefits of school-to-work institutions and programs. Although there is an absence of evidence on longer-
run effects, it appears that institutions and programs to improve the school-to-work transition deliver 
benefits in terms of labor market attachment, skill formation, and higher wages and earnings. However, 
there are a number of missing pieces of evidence, in particular with regard to the longer-term effects of 
specific programs. In the past decade, school-to-work efforts were largely dismantled, in favor of test-
based educational reforms. The evidence suggests that explicit school-to-work programs—such as those 
encouraged by the STWOA—deliver benefits. This suggests that policymakers concerned with improving 
education to enhance labor market success would likely do better by pursuing a more balanced mix of 
strengthening school-to-work institutions and programs along with other educational reforms than has 
been the case with the either/or approach of federal policy in the last decade and a half.
58 At the same 
time, there are two qualifications to this suggestion simply to pursue both types of policies. First, under 
any circumstances, there will be tradeoffs between school-to-work efforts and a greater focus on 
academic preparation, as there is a fixed amount of time that students can allocate during the school day. 
Indeed, concerns that NCLB has cut into the time available for course electives generally, and work-
related courses specifically, have already been voiced (e.g., Stone and Aliaga, 2007, p. 82).
59 And second, 
it is essential to remain cognizant of the limitation of school-to-work programs as well as education 
reform efforts, which serve current students who will work in the future, but not older individuals already 
in the labor market.
60 
                                                 
58 Although difficult to establish rigorously, it is also my impression that the $1.5 billion in federal funds for the 
STWOA seem to have had rather dramatic policy impacts in terms of spurring the creation of school-to-work 
programs in the states, presumably because the seed money provided by the STWOA interacted with other 
incentives for states to create school-to-work programs. 
59 Figlio (2007) discusses a number of studies that address the issue of tradeoffs between resources devoted to 
accountability programs and other activities in schools 
60 This qualification is even more relevant to discussions of the potential higher efficacy of early (i.e., childhood) 




Because I have striven to discuss the evidence on policies to increase economic self-sufficiency 
via higher earnings, I have of necessity focused on policies already in place. Including both those I 
discussed in detail, and those to which I gave shorter shrift, these policies focus on either mandating 
higher wages, encouraging work, or increasing skills. I have suggested that we have (or had) in place 
successful policies to encourage work (the EITC) and to increase skills (school-to-work). On the other 
hand, I have argued that mandating higher wage floors is ineffective or even counter-productive.  
An obvious question is whether there are new policies that have been tried on a much less 
extensive basis that might hold promise. One I discussed in some detail is the expansion of work 
subsidies (in the form of the EITC, perhaps) to unrelated individuals, although I have suggested that this 
may have undesirable distributional effects. Focusing instead on skill formation, Holzer (2007) has 
advocated a broad-based system of federal grants to encourage skill formation—which he labels Worker 
Advancement Grants for Employment in States (WAGES). The call for this broad-based program is based 
in part on fairly compelling evidence of beneficial effects (such as for school-to-work programs or 
community college enrollment), and in part on less rigorous evidence pointing to isolated examples of 
other types of programs that appear to be particularly effective, even if in other locations or settings they 
are less effective. Recognizing that the research evidence on the effects of these other programs is weak, 
Holzer has proposed simultaneous adoption of a competitive process for states to receive federal funds, 
based on program evaluation. There are legitimate questions as to whether building evaluation 
requirements into the program will be effective in creating a process whereby the most effective programs 
emerge and “crowd out” the least effective.
61 Moreover, I think it is likely that Holzer’s back-of-the 
envelope calculations about the social returns to investments in these programs are overoptimistic.
62  
Nonetheless, it is probably true that, in the long-run, policies that increase skills are the “holy 
                                                 
61 Neumark (2006) presents an analysis of program evaluation of school-to-work programs in California that raise 
warning flags about the implementation of evaluation mandates. On the other hand, Blank (2002) argues that the 
process of experimentation and evaluation was very successful in the arena of welfare reform.    
62 In particular, his calculations are based on estimates of gains from programs that are apparently the highest among 
the estimates he surveys, and in each case come from an isolated program when estimates of the earnings gains 
from similar programs implemented elsewhere were smaller and often insignificant (see p. 20 of his paper). 
Whether these high estimates reflect best practices or simply statistical outliers, it is probably unreasonable to 
presume that gains of these magnitudes will be replicated across-the-board, even with the best institutional 







grail” that can give individuals the capacity to achieve economic self-sufficiency through their own 
earnings, and that we should be open to some of the new ideas (labor market intermediaries, sectoral 
training, career ladders, etc.) that Holzer discusses. Especially in light of what is probably a cultural bias 
in the United States towards meeting the goals of economic self-sufficiency through earnings rather than 
public support, it is hard to argue against the merit, in principle, of efforts devoted to trying to raise skills 
of the less-skilled and less-advantaged population. And if a structure can be successfully built that 
encourages innovative programs, while at the same time being hard-nosed about program evaluation—
discarding unsuccessful programs, promoting the successful ones, and killing the whole project if it does 
not deliver programs that are cost effective and scalable—then we may ultimately learn something useful 
and make some progress regarding policies to raise skills and increase the economic self-sufficiency of 
individuals and families through labor market earnings.         
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Figure 1: Effects of 10-Percent Minimum Wage Increase 
      A.  Wages         B.  Hours 








































































































































































































































Source: Neumark et al. (1994). 
 
Note: The estimates are based on data from matched CPS ORG files for 1979-1997. Significance levels for two-sided tests are indicated as follows: 
1 percent—solid; 5 percent—striped; 10 percent—dotted. These are computed from bootstrapped standard errors. See the text for explanation.   
Figure 2: Estimated Effects of Minimum Wages on Distribution of Family Income/Needs, 1986-1995 
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Figure 2 (continued) 
 
C. Combined Effects 
 
 
Source: Neumark et al. (2005). 
 
Note: The estimates are based on data taken from matched CPS March files for 1986-1995. See the text for explanation.    
 
Table 1: State Minimum Wages Above the Federal Level, as of January 2007 
State Minimum  wage  Details 
West Virginia  $5.85  Employers with 6 or more employees, > $500,000 in gross 
income, not engaged in interstate commerce; $6.55 on July 1, 




$6.15  Minnesota: $5.25 for employers with receipts < $625,000 




$6.25  Arkansas: 4 or more employees 
Pennsylvania: $7.15 on July 1, 2007 
Illinois, Missouri, 
Wisconsin 
$6.50  Illinois: $7.50 on July 1, 2007; increments of $.25 each July 1 
through 2010 
Delaware  $6.65  $7.15 on Jan. 1, 2008 
Florida $6.67  Indexed 
Arizona, Maine  $6.75  Maine: $7.00 on Oct. 1, 2007  
Colorado, Ohio  $6.85  Limited industries 
Colorado: indexed to CPI-U 
Michigan  $6.95  $7.15 on July 1, 2007; $7.40 on July1, 2008 
District of Columbia  $7.00  Minimum of $1 over federal minimum 
Alaska, New Jersey, 
New York 
$7.15  
Hawaii $7.25   
Rhode Island  $7.40   
California, 
Massachusetts 
$7.50  California: $8.00 on Jan. 1, 2008 
Vermont  $7.53  2 or more employees; indexed 
Connecticut $7.65   
Oregon $7.80  Indexed 
Washington $7.93  Indexed 
Sources: http://www.dol.gov/esa/minwage/america.htm (viewed May 2, 2007); 
http://www.floridajobs.org/resources/Mim%20Wage%20Const%20Language.pdf (viewed May 2, 2007); 
http://blog.laborlawcenter.com/2006/09/06/minimum-wage-in-west-virginia/ (viewed May 2, 2007).   
Table 2: Estimated Effects of Minimum Wage Increases on Proportions in Income-to-Needs Ranges 
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Source: Neumark et al. (2005).  
 
Notes: The data come from matched CPS March files, from 1986-1995. Estimates are constructed by integrating under the densities reported in Figure 2. The total sample size 
for the analysis, including families with income-to-needs up to 6, is 196,270. Standard errors are bootstrapped, based on 500 repetitions, with implied t-statistics 
asymptotically normally distributed.  +, *, and ** indicate that estimate is statistically significant at the 10-, 5-, or 1-percent level.  
  
 
Table 3: Wages and Family Income-to-Needs 
Income-to-Needs Ranges 
0-0.5 0.5-1 1-1.5 1.5-2  2-3 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Share of families with at least one worker earning 
less than 110 percent of minimum wage that 
are exposed to minimum wage increase 
0.19 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.06 
Distributions of primary earners in family income-
to-needs category by hourly earnings: 
     
Less  than  90  percent  minimum  0.49 0.27 0.12 0.06 0.03 
90 - 110 percent of minimum  0.17  0.18  0.12  0.05  0.02 
110  -  200  percent  of  minimum  0.25 0.43 0.53 0.50 0.29 
More than 200 percent of minimum  0.09  0.12  0.23  0.39  0.66 
Distributions of lowest earner in family in family 
income-to-needs category by hourly earnings: 
     
Less  than  90  percent  minimum  0.57 0.52 0.41 0.34 0.25 
90 - 110 percent of minimum  0.20  0.16  0.18  0.17  0.14 
110  -  200  percent  of  minimum  0.17 0.26 0.32 0.40 0.45 
More than 200 percent of minimum  0.06  0.06  0.08  0.10  0.16 
Distributions of workers by family income-to-
needs: 
     
Less  than  90  percent  minimum  0.13 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.18 
90 - 110 percent of minimum  0.08  0.14  0.15  0.11  0.19 
110  -  200  percent  of  minimum  0.03 0.08 0.12 0.14 0.23 
More than 200 percent of minimum  0.01  0.01  0.03  0.05  0.16 
N  2,979 5,980 8,852  10,741  24,420 
Source: Neumark et al. (2005).  
 
Notes: Income-to-needs categories and income measures are reported for year 1 for each family. Hourly earnings are 
calculated using annual wage and salary income / {(weeks worked last year)·(usual hours worked last year)}; this way we use 
the full March files, rather than only the ORG files. In the second and third panels the columns sum to 1; in the fourth panel 
the rows sum to 1 but entries are not shown for income-to-needs greater than 3. The third panel is restricted to families with 
at least two earners.  
Table 4: Evidence on the Distributional Effects of Minimum Wages 




March 1990 and 
1992 CPS files 
Workers, all families  Larger minimum wage increases associated with 
poverty reductions, but never significant with controls 
for overall state employment or unemployment. 
Slightly stronger evidence of anti-poverty effects for 
sample of workers only (but still often insignificant).    
Conditioning on employment by studying 









Workers, all families  Larger minimum wage increases associated with 
poverty reductions, but evidence never significant with 
state unemployment controls. Even for workers, 
estimated effects near zero and insignificant.   
Specifications with state employment controls 
not included, although these entered more 
strongly in Card and Krueger’s analysis. 
Sabia (2006)  March CPS files, 
1990-2005 
Employed single 
mothers aged 15-55,  
No evidence of effects of minimum wages on poverty.  Burkhauser and Sabia (2007) extend analysis to 
all single female heads of household, with 




March CPS files, 
1981-2000 




white families, black 
families) 
Mixed evidence: some estimates point to minimum 
wages reducing poverty; but for preferred specification 
(after-tax income, using squared poverty gap) 
estimated effect varies in sign and is never significant. 
 
Wu et al. 
(2006a) 
March CPS files, 
1981-1997 
All families  For a wide variety of inequality measures (but not all), 
using after-tax income, minimum wages increase 
inequality. Evidence strongest for inequality measures 
that place more weight on transfers at low end of 
income distribution. Using pre-tax income, minimum 
wages always estimated to increase inequality.  




Table 5: Living Wage Laws in the Eight Largest Cities, as of 2006 
 Level  Prevailing  minimum  wage  Coverage 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
New York  $10  $5.15  Service contractors 
Los Angeles  $9.39  $6.75  Service contractors, financial 
assistance recipients 
Chicago  $10  $6.50  For-profit contractors in 
specific categories of workers 
Philadelphia  150% of higher 
of federal or state 
minimum wage 
$5.15  Contractors, business with city 
leases/franchises/concessions, 
city employees  
San Diego  $10  $6.75  Contractors, financial assistance 
recipients 
San Antonio  70% of 
employees in 







minimum for all 
workers is $9.62 
$5.15  Financial assistance recipients 
(tax abatements) 
Detroit  $10  $5.15  Service contractors, financial 
assistance recipients 
San Jose  $12.27  $6.75  Service contractors in specific 
categories, financial assistance 
recipients 
Source: http://www.livingwagecampaign.org/index.php?id=1958 (viewed November 11, 2006). 
 
Notes: In most cases, the required wage level is higher if health insurance benefits are not provided. The living wage 
if such benefits are provided is reported. The prevailing minimum wage is the higher of the state or federal 
minimum.   
 
Table 6: Estimated Effects of Living Wage Laws 
Dependent variable: 
Log wages, lowest 





decile of predicted  
wage distribution  
 
Probability that family 
income 
below poverty 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
All living wage laws:      
Log living wage, 




living wage laws:      
Log living wage, 





wage laws:      
Log living wage, 
lagged 12 months    -0.006 -0.027  -0.038 
N 46,374  116,466  142,421 
Source: Adams and Neumark (2004).  
 
Notes: The data on labor market outcomes and other worker-related characteristics come from the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) monthly Outgoing Rotation Group files (ORGs), from January 1996 through December 
2002, and the CPS Annual Demographic Files (ADFs), from 1996 through 2002, for individuals or families 
residing in MSA’s, in city-month cells with 25 or more observations. The data for the first two columns cover 
1996-2002, and for the last column covers 1995-2001. The regressions include controls for city, year, month, 
minimum wages, and other individual-level controls in the wage and employment specifications, and controls for 
city, year, and minimum wages in the poverty specification. All specifications also allow differential linear time 
trends for cities passing or not passing living wage laws, or passing different types of laws. The entries in the 
first row are from a specification with a single living wage variable, and the entries in the second and third rows 
are from a specification interacting the living wage variable with dummy variables for the type of living wage. 
The coefficients for the log wage equation are from log-log specifications, and hence are elasticities. The 
coefficients from the employment and poverty regressions measure the change in the share employed or poor in 
response to a one-unit increase in the log living wage (or a 100-percent increase). ‘**’ (‘*’) superscript indicates 
estimate is statistically significant at five-percent (ten-percent) level. Reported standard errors are robust to 
nonindependence (and heteroscedasticity) within city cells. 
 
Table 7: Linear Probability Estimates of Effects of School-to-Work Participation on College 
Attendance and Employment 
 Some  college  Employment 
A. Detailed Control Variables   (1)  (2)  (1’)  (2’) 






























































Demographic  controls  only  X X X  X 
Add controls for living arrangements/family 
structure, ASVAB, and school behaviors 
 X   X 













































































































































Hausman test for excluding school fixed effects, p-
value 
 .18   .24 
School fixed effects    X    X 
Source: Neumark and Rothstein (2006).  
 
Notes: There are 2,933 observations in all of the specifications. School and work outcomes are measured as of the post-
high school interview (1999 or 2000). The standard errors allow for general heteroscedasticity and non-independence 
within schools. The sets of control variables are listed in detail Neumark and Rothstein (2006). Asterisks denote 
statistical significance of the coefficient estimates, with ***, **, and * indicating that the estimate is significantly 
different from zero at the one-, five-, and ten-percent levels, respectively.  
 
Table 8: Summary of Effects of STW Participation on Forgotten Half 
 Schooling-related  Work-related 
 (1)  (2) 
Females    
Skill increasing    
Job shadowing    Idle: −− 
Mentoring    







Attended 2-year college: ++  Earnings, uncond.: +++ 
Wage, uncond.: ++ 
Earnings, cond.: ++ 
Wage, cond.: ++ 
Skill decreasing    
Tech prep  Any college: −  
Internship/ 
apprenticeship 
 Training:  − 
 
Males    
Skill increasing    
Job shadowing  Weeks in school: ++  Earnings, cond.: + 
Mentoring  Any college: + 
Currently enrolled: + 
Attended 4-year college: ++ 
 
Coop  Any college: ++ 
Currently enrolled: +++ 




 Weeks  working:  + 
Weeks idle: −− 
Tech prep  Weeks in school: + 
 




Attended 2-year college: ++  Currently working: +++ 
Weeks idle: − 
Skill decreasing    
Internship/ 
apprenticeship 
Attended 4-year college: −− 
 
 
Source: Neumark and Rothstein (2007). 
 
Notes: The results shown are those for which the estimated effect was statistically 
significant at the ten-percent level or better only for the forgotten half (or 
significant with the opposite sign for the forgotten half). The sign is as indicated, 
appearing three, two, or one, times to indicate that the estimate for the indicated 
group is significantly different from zero at the one-, five-, or ten-percent level, 
respectively. In all cases, effects that increase schooling, work, skills, or earnings 






   